CVE-2026-99762: batman-adv: mcast: validate tracker padding before forwarding
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: mcast: validate tracker padding before forwarding
A multicast tracker with an even number of destinations needs two padding bytes after its destination list. batadvmcastforwpacket() currently only checks that the count field and the addresses fit in the tracker TVLV.
If an unpadded even tracker is compacted to an odd number of destinations, batadvmcastforwshrinkupdateheaders() includes those missing padding bytes in the amount to remove. The subsequent memmove can then write two bytes past the old packet tail. With no tailroom, this corrupts skbsharedinfo.
Include the required padding in the existing tracker length check. This rejects the malformed tracker before either received or locally generated packets can reach the compactor.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.12.118 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.18.64 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.5 - Upgrade
Upgrade
debian/linuxto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.1.176-1Fixed in 6.1.192-2Fixed in 7.3.5-1 - Compensating control
In the Linux kernel batman-adv multicast tracker, include the required padding bytes in the existing tracker length check before forwarding or compacting the tracker.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What conditions are required for the out-of-bounds write to occur?
The multicast tracker must have an even number of destinations but lack its required two padding bytes, then be compacted to an odd number of destinations. If the packet has no tailroom, the resulting memmove can write two bytes beyond the previous packet tail and corrupt skb_shared_info.
Are only received packets affected?
No. The malformed tracker can reach the compactor through either received packets or locally generated packets.
What does the fix do to prevent exploitation?
The fix includes the required tracker padding in the existing length validation. Malformed unpadded trackers are rejected before they reach the compaction logic.