CVE-2026-99764: 9p/xen: validate the response size from the backend
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
9p/xen: validate the response size from the backend
p9xenresponse() takes the length of an incoming response from the ring -- the first field of the 9p header, which the Xen transport reuses as its framing header -- and uses it to advance the consumer index, but never checks that it is at least the header size or no larger than the number of bytes the backend has actually produced.
A malicious or buggy backend can post a response whose size is smaller than the header (for example 0). The consumer index then never advances, so the response work re-reads the same ring contents instead of making progress. In testing this raced with the teardown that the malformed reply triggers and dereferenced a freed p9client:
9pfs 9pfs-0: Wrong req tag=ffff BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000060 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: errorcode(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5 #6 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events p9xenresponse RIP: 0010:idrfind+0x4/0x10 RSP: 0018:ffffbf5d80063de8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffa229c21195a0 RCX: ffffa229c2400000 RDX: ffffa229c11c2200 RSI: 000000000000ffff RDI: 0000000000000050 RBP: 000000000000ffff R08: 3fffffffffffdfff R09: ffffffffffffffff R10: 3fffffffffffdfff R11: ffffffff87a60e80 R12: 0000000000000050 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000100000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa22a7661c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000060 CR3: 000000003ac34002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> p9taglookup+0x2b/0x90 p9xenresponse+0x17c/0x2e0 processonework+0x16a/0x3a0 workerthread+0x172/0x2e0 kthread+0xdd/0x110 retfromfork+0x18b/0x240 retfromforkasm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000060 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Reject a response whose size is outside [sizeof(header), queued] before using it, matching the validation the backend already applies to incoming requests.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.12.118 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.18.64 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.5 - Compensating control
In p9_xen_response(), reject responses whose size is less than sizeof(header) or greater than the number of bytes the backend has produced (queued) before using the size.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to this issue?
Systems using the Linux kernel's 9p Xen transport are exposed when their Xen backend is malicious or buggy. The issue is triggered by malformed responses supplied by that backend.
What does an attacker or faulty backend need to send to trigger the problem?
The backend must post a response with an invalid declared size, such as a size smaller than the 9p header or larger than the bytes actually produced. A zero-sized response can prevent the consumer index from advancing and cause the same ring data to be processed repeatedly.
What is the potential impact?
Malformed responses can cause response processing to race with teardown and dereference a freed p9_client. The reported behavior includes a kernel NULL pointer dereference.
How can I tell whether a system may already be experiencing this issue?
Relevant signs include 9pfs messages such as "Wrong req tag=ffff" followed by a kernel NULL pointer dereference during 9p Xen response handling or teardown. The provided report shows this occurring in a worker thread after a malformed backend reply.