CVE-2026-99771: wifi: mac80211: reload TDLS header pointer after skb_linearize()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: reload TDLS header pointer after skblinearize()
ieee80211processtdlschannelswitch() sets tf = skb->data before it calls skblinearize(), and reads tf->actioncode afterwards.
ieee80211rxhdata() queues TDLS channel switch requests and responses to the interface after pulling only offsetof(struct ieee80211tdlsdata, u) bytes, so the skb can still be non-linear when the interface work handles it. Drivers that build paged RX skbs do this for every frame that does not fit into the skb head, e.g. iwlwifi (mvm), which is also the only mac80211 driver that sets NL80211FEATURETDLSCHANNELSWITCH. If the remaining data does not fit into the tailroom, skblinearize() moves the data to a new head and frees the old one, and the action code is then read from freed memory. Depending on what that memory holds by then, the frame is handled as before or ends in the WARNONONCE() of the default case.
The frame only has to be a data frame with the TDLS ethertype from an authorized peer, e.g. relayed by the AP from another station in the BSS; the read happens before the sender is checked to be a TDLS peer.
Load tf after skblinearize(), as the request and response handlers already do.
Found by static analysis tool CodeQL.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.12.118 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.18.64 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.5 - Upgrade
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debian/linuxto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.5-1
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which systems are most likely to be affected?
The issue is relevant to mac80211 drivers that build paged receive SKBs and support TDLS channel switching. The description identifies iwlwifi (mvm) as an example and states that it is the only mac80211 driver that sets NL80211_FEATURE_TDLS_CHANNEL_SWITCH.
What does an attacker need to send to trigger the vulnerable path?
The attacker only needs to cause receipt of a data frame carrying the TDLS ethertype from an authorized peer. The frame may be relayed by the access point from another station in the same BSS, and the vulnerable read occurs before the sender is verified as a TDLS peer.
What behavior may indicate exploitation or triggering?
After the packet is linearized, the code can read the TDLS action code from freed memory. Depending on the contents of that memory, the frame may be processed as before or may reach the default-case WARN_ON_ONCE().
Is TDLS peer validation sufficient to prevent the affected read?
No. The description states that the action-code read occurs before the sender is checked to be a TDLS peer, so a frame need not come from an already validated TDLS peer to reach the read.