CVE-2026-99794: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Reject signalling responses in invalid states
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Reject signalling responses in invalid states
A peer can send configuration messages while an incoming channel is in BTCONNECT2, before the security or deferred accept gate has completed. A configuration response can then promote the channel to BTCONNECTED. Configuration responses can also act on channels that are closing, and a late connection response can move a disconnecting channel back to BTCONFIG.
Accept connection responses only while waiting in BTCONNECT. Answer configuration requests in BTCONNECT2, but defer our own request until BTCONFIG so configuration cannot complete before the gate. Ignore configuration responses outside BTCONFIG and BTCONNECTED, and only complete configuration in BTCONFIG.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.12.118 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.18.64 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.5 - Upgrade
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debian/linuxto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.5-1 - Compensating control
Validate L2CAP signaling messages against channel state: accept connection responses only in BT_CONNECT; handle configuration requests in BT_CONFIG or BT_CONNECTED; complete configuration only in BT_CONFIG and ignore configuration responses outside BT_CONFIG. This prevents premature configuration completion and late responses from changing channels in invalid states.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can trigger the issue?
A Bluetooth peer can trigger it by sending L2CAP signalling messages at specific points during incoming-channel setup or teardown. Exploitation requires the peer to interact with the affected system over Bluetooth.
What channel states are involved?
The issue affects incoming channels in BT_CONNECT2 before the security or deferred-accept gate completes, as well as channels that are closing or disconnecting. Malformed or late signalling responses could incorrectly advance channel state to BT_CONNECTED or move a disconnecting channel back to BT_CONFIG.
What is the mitigation if the fix cannot be applied immediately?
The provided data does not identify a configuration workaround. Reducing exposure to untrusted Bluetooth peers can limit the opportunity for a peer to send the affected signalling messages.
How does the fix prevent invalid state transitions?
It accepts connection responses only in BT_CONNECT, defers locally initiated configuration until BT_CONFIG, ignores configuration responses outside BT_CONFIG and BT_CONNECTED, and only completes configuration in BT_CONFIG.