CVE-2026-99802: io_uring/register: enforce per-task restrictions in io_uring_register_blind()

Published Nov 20, 2026
·
Updated

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iouring/register: enforce per-task restrictions in iouringregisterblind()

When iouringregister(2) is invoked with fd == -1, it dispatches directly to iouringregisterblind() without checking current->iouringrestrict.

As a result, a task with per-task register restrictions installed via IORINGREGISTERRESTRICTIONS can still invoke blind registration opcodes such as IORINGREGISTERSENDMSGRING even when those opcodes are not in the task's allowed registerop bitmap.

Check current->iouringrestrict->registerop in iouringregisterblind() before dispatching blind registration opcodes.

Affected Software

3 affected componentsFixes available
linux/kernel>=7.0.0<7.3.2
7.3.2
debian/linux<7.3.3-1
7.3.3-1
debian/linux
6.1.176-16.1.192-26.12.107-16.12.117-17.3.4-17.3.5-1

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade linux/Kernel to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 7.3.2
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/linux to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 7.3.3-1
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/linux to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.1.176-1Fixed in 6.1.192-2Fixed in 6.12.107-1Fixed in 6.12.117-1Fixed in 7.3.4-1Fixed in 7.3.5-1

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which systems are affected by this bypass?

The issue applies to Linux kernel environments that use io_uring per-task registration restrictions installed through IORING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS. It specifically affects blind registration requests made through io_uring_register(2) with fd set to -1.

2

What does an attacker need to exploit it?

An attacker needs to be able to invoke io_uring_register(2) in a task that has per-task register restrictions configured. They can then use a blind registration opcode, such as IORING_REGISTER_SEND_MSG_RING, that is absent from that task's allowed register_op bitmap.

3

Is the protection bypass limited to a particular registration path?

Yes. The bypass occurs because the fd == -1 path dispatches directly to io_uring_register_blind() without checking the task's register_op restrictions. Other behavior is not described in the available data.

4

How can administrators determine whether their kernel includes the fix?

The fixed behavior checks current->io_uring_restrict->register_op in io_uring_register_blind() before dispatching blind registration opcodes. Administrators can inspect their kernel source or vendor patch information for that check.

Contact

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