DEBIAN-CVE-2026-123119: Debian/symfony vulnerability
The Symfony HttpClient component NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient does not pin the checked IP address of cached hosts, allowing for DNS rebinding to bypass private network restrictions, resulting in enumeration of internal hosts and ports in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11. NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient resolves the host of each request and checks the IP before connecting. It caches the result per host, and passes the IP to the decorated client through the resolve option so that the client connects to the exact IP that was checked. The issue is that resolve was only passed on the first lookup of a host: on subsequent requests, the decorated client resolved the host again on its own. An attacker who controls a host's DNS can exploit this with DNS rebinding by answering the first lookup with a public IP, and subsequent lookups with a private IP, so when an application sends several requests to that host through the same client, the later requests connect to the private IP. This happens, for example, when an application fetches several URLs of a repository provided by a user. The check of the primaryip in the onprogress callback still aborts the request before anything is sent, but the connection is made, and the error differs depending on whether the port is open or closed. This allows enumerating internal hosts and ports, as in CVE-2024-50342.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
Symfony HttpClient componentto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 5.4.56 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Symfony HttpClient componentto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.4.50 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Symfony HttpClient componentto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.4.23 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Symfony HttpClient componentto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 8.1.11
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which applications are exposed to this issue?
Applications are exposed when they use Symfony's NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient to make multiple requests to a host whose DNS is controlled by an attacker. A cited example is fetching several repository URLs supplied by a user.
What does an attacker need to exploit the vulnerability?
The attacker must control the DNS responses for a host requested by the application. They first return a public IP address so the initial check passes, then return a private IP address on later DNS resolution attempts.
Are repeated requests required for exploitation?
Yes. The first lookup is passed to the decorated client using the checked IP address, while later requests to the cached host can cause the decorated client to resolve the hostname again and connect to a different IP address.
What impact can successful exploitation have?
An attacker can bypass the private-network restriction and use the application to enumerate internal hosts and ports.