EEF-CVE-2026-126334: Joining a LiveView without `"url"` skips its `live_session` `on_mount` hooks
Summary
Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenixliveview allows an authenticated user to mount a router-mounted LiveView without the onmount hooks of its livesession via a phxjoin message that carries neither a "url" nor a "redirect" key.
The catch-all clause of the private Phoenix.LiveView.Channel.authorizesession/3 in lib/phoenixliveview/channel.ex accepts a join without a URL for any session, including a root LiveView mounted at the router. The channel then mounts the LiveView with no route, and only a route adds the livesession hooks to the mount lifecycle. Checks that those hooks perform on the connected mount do not run, and event checks that they attach through attachhook/4 are never attached. The attacker needs a valid session token for the LiveView, which only the HTTP render issues, after the hooks pass there. onmount hooks declared in the LiveView module still run.
This issue affects phoenixliveview: from 0.16.0 before 1.0.20, from 1.1.0-rc.0 before 1.1.34, and from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.2.14.
Details
1. Join authorization. The private Phoenix.LiveView.Channel.authorizesession/3 in lib/phoenixliveview/channel.ex has three clauses. The "redirect" clause resolves the route and checks that it stays in the same livesession. The "url" clause requires, for a session where Phoenix.LiveView.Session.main?/1 is true, that the route for the URL matches the view and the livesession of the session. The third clause matches any other join parameters and returns the session with no route and no URL. Nested LiveViews need this clause because they have no URL. The clause does not call Phoenix.LiveView.Session.main?/1, so it also accepts a root LiveView that was mounted at the router.
2. Mount with no route. With no route, mount/3 receives :notmountedatrouter as its params. The private loadlifecycle/2 adds the onmount hooks of the livesession only when it receives a %Phoenix.LiveView.Route{}. Without a route it returns the lifecycle of the LiveView module alone. The livesession layout is skipped in the same way.
3. Result. The signed session token, the static token, the CSRF token, and the session cookie are all valid, so the join succeeds. The LiveView runs without the livesession hooks. Hooks that halt the mount do not run, and hooks attached with attachhook/4 for :handleevent or :handleinfo are never attached.
Conditions that stop the mount. A LiveView that defines handleparams/3 raises on a mount without a route. A LiveView whose mount/3 matches its params as a map raises. A LiveView that reads an assign that a skipped hook sets raises. In these cases the join fails.
The official JavaScript client always sends "url" or "redirect" for a root LiveView. Only nested views join without either key.
Proof of concept
The target application has a livesession whose onmount hook halts the mount for a suspended account and attaches a :handleevent hook with attachhook/4 that denies the deletepost event to users who are not admins. The LiveView at /posts does not define handleparams/3.
1. Sign in as a user without the admin role and load /posts over HTTP. Keep the session cookie, the CSRF token from the page, and the id, data-phx-session, and data-phx-static attributes of the element that has data-phx-main. 2. Open the LiveView websocket at /live/websocket with the session cookie and the CSRF token. 3. Send a phxjoin message on the topic lv:<id>. The payload has "params" (with "csrftoken" and "mounts": 0), "session", and "static". It has no "url" key and no "redirect" key. 4. The server replies with status ok. The LiveView is mounted without the livesession hooks. 5. Send an event message of type click for the event deletepost. The LiveView handles the event, and the post is deleted.
The same join with the "url" key set to the page URL runs the hooks, and the deletepost event is denied. If the account is suspended after step 1, the join with "url" is refused, and the join without "url" still succeeds.
Impact
An authenticated user can send events that the livesession hooks would deny. A user whose access was revoked after the page loaded can still mount the LiveView and send events while the LiveView session token is valid.
Workarounds
Move the security-relevant onmount hooks from the livesession to the LiveView module with Phoenix.LiveView.onmount/1, for example in the liveview definition that use MyAppWeb, :liveview expands. Hooks declared in the module run on every mount.
Alternatively, make mount/3 match its first argument as a map (%{} = params), or define handleparams/3 in the LiveView. In both cases a mount without a route raises, and the join fails.
Configurations
The application enforces authentication or authorization in onmount hooks of a livesession, and the LiveView does not do the same check itself. The LiveView must also mount without a route: it does not define handleparams/3, its mount/3 accepts :notmountedatrouter as its params, and it does not read assigns that the skipped hooks set.
Other sources
Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenixliveview allows an authenticated user to mount a router-mounted LiveView without the onmount hooks of its livesession via a phxjoin message that carries neither a "url" nor a "redirect" key.
The catch-all clause of the private Phoenix.LiveView.Channel.authorizesession/3 in lib/phoenixliveview/channel.ex accepts a join without a URL for any session, including a root LiveView mounted at the router. The channel then mounts the LiveView with no route, and only a route adds the livesession hooks to the mount lifecycle. Checks that those hooks perform on the connected mount do not run, and event checks that they attach through attachhook/4 are never attached. The attacker needs a valid session token for the LiveView, which only the HTTP render issues, after the hooks pass there. onmount hooks declared in the LiveView module still run.
This issue affects phoenixliveview: from 0.16.0 before 1.0.20, from 1.1.0-rc.0 before 1.1.34, and from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.2.14.
— OSV
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
erlang/phoenix_live_viewto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.0.20 - Upgrade
Upgrade
erlang/phoenix_live_viewto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.1.34 - Upgrade
Upgrade
erlang/phoenix_live_viewto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.2.14 - Upgrade
Upgrade
phoenix_live_viewto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.0.20 - Upgrade
Upgrade
phoenix_live_viewto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.1.34 - Upgrade
Upgrade
phoenix_live_viewto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.2.14 - Configuration
Move security-relevant on_mount hooks from live_session to the LiveView module so they run on every mount.
Phoenix LiveView security-relevant on_mount hooks = LiveView module via Phoenix.LiveView.on_mount/1
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which applications are realistically exposed to this issue?
Applications using affected Phoenix LiveView versions are exposed when router-mounted LiveViews rely on live_session on_mount hooks for authorization or for event checks installed with attach_hook/4. Hooks declared directly in the LiveView module still run.
What does an attacker need to bypass the live_session hooks?
The attacker must be authenticated and possess a valid LiveView session token. That token is issued only by the HTTP render after the hooks have already passed.
Are default LiveView deployments affected?
The issue affects router-mounted LiveViews in affected versions, but the practical impact depends on whether security checks are implemented in live_session on_mount hooks. A join request lacking both the "url" and "redirect" keys can cause those hooks not to run on the connected mount.
How can I determine whether my application is affected?
Review whether you use Phoenix LiveView versions from 0.16.0 before 1.0.20, 1.1.0-rc.0 before 1.1.34, or 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.2.14. Then identify router-mounted LiveViews whose authorization or event enforcement is supplied by their live_session on_mount hooks.
What mitigation is available if updating cannot happen immediately?
Ensure authorization checks are also performed by on_mount hooks declared in the LiveView module, since those hooks still run. Do not rely solely on live_session hooks for connected-mount authorization or for attaching event-enforcement hooks.