First published: Mon Mar 13 2023(Updated: )
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection. (CVE-2022-4304 )
Affected Software | Affected Version | How to fix |
---|---|---|
F5 BIG-IP | >=17.0.0<=17.1.0 | 17.1.117.1.0.1 |
F5 BIG-IP | >=16.1.0<=16.1.4 | 16.1.5 |
F5 BIG-IP | >=15.1.0<=15.1.9 | 15.1.10 |
F5 BIG-IP | >=14.1.0<=14.1.5 | |
F5 BIG-IP | >=13.1.0<=13.1.5 | |
F5 BIG-IP Next SPK | >=1.5.0<=1.7.1 | |
F5 BIG-IQ Centralized Management | >=8.0.0<=8.3.0 | |
F5 BIG-IQ Centralized Management | =7.1.0 | |
F5 F5OS-A | =1.3.1 | |
F5 Traffix SDC | =5.2.0 |
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