GHSA-2223-f22x-24cq: Path Traversal
Impact
Affected versions of Winter CMS allow authenticated backend users with the cms.manageassets permission ("Manage website assets - images, JavaScript files, CSS files") to disclose arbitrary files readable by the PHP process by placing an =include / =require directive in a theme JavaScript asset.
Winter\Storm\Parse\Assetic\Filter\JavascriptImporter processes =include / =require directives found in comment blocks of JavaScript assets passed through System\Classes\CombineAssets. The directive target was resolved relative to the including file's own directory with realpath() and inlined into the combined output with no confinement check, so a directive such as =include ../../../.env escaped the theme's asset tree and inlined an arbitrary server-readable file. The only restriction was that the target had to have a file extension, since extension-less names had .js appended to them.
Because the combined output is served through the combine/{file} route, which performs no authentication or authorization checks, the disclosed contents then became readable by unauthenticated visitors at a stable URL as soon as the asset was referenced by any template.
The leaked content includes any file the web process can read, most importantly the application .env file (disclosing APPKEY and database credentials). Text files were disclosed intact; binary content was mangled by the minification pipeline.
This is the JavaScript-importer counterpart of GHSA-58fp-mcx6-7qf9 (Local File Inclusion through LESS @import directives) and of CVE-2023-52085 / GHSA-2x7r-93ww-cxrq — the same vulnerability class reached through a different asset combiner filter.
To actively exploit this issue, an attacker would need an authenticated backend account with the cms.manageassets permission. By default this permission is assigned to the built-in Developer role. The Winter CMS maintainers strongly recommend that the cms.manageassets permission only be reserved to trusted administrators and developers in general, as it grants direct write access to files that are combined and served publicly.
Patches
JavascriptImporter in Winter Storm now applies two independent gates to every =include / =require target:
1. Only .js targets may be inlined. Any other extension is rejected before path resolution, which neutralises disclosure of non-JavaScript server files such as .env, .php, and .log. Extension-less includes are unaffected, as they are resolved to .js before this check, exactly as before. 2. The resolved path must lie within the including file's own directory subtree or one of the caller-configured allowed import roots, enforced through the new PathResolver::withinAny() helper. A rejected include emits a comment in place of the file contents (or throws, if the directive was =require).
The allowed-roots configuration is now shared between the JavaScript importer and the LESS compiler through a HasAllowedImportRoots trait, and System\Classes\CombineAssets configures both — along with the CSS @import filter, using the import validator added in assetic/framework v3.2.1 — with themespath(), pluginspath(), and basepath('modules') as the allowed roots. This preserves the cross-tree imports that shipped themes and plugins legitimately use (e.g. a plugin asset importing a module asset) while confining everything else.
The backend permission descriptions for cms.manageassets and cms.managecontent now also carry the same "should only be given to trusted users" warning that was already displayed for cms.managepages, cms.managelayouts, and cms.managepartials.
This security issue has been fixed in v1.2.13 (Winter core) and v1.2.13 (Winter Storm).
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, apply https://github.com/wintercms/storm/commit/fd673f4f32140c97c68b1ed705764b819747fbdf and https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/e09c8d3526f3583cb6c3476a021b885088ecd4bd manually. As an interim mitigation, remove the cms.manageassets permission from any role that is not held by a fully trusted administrator or developer, and audit existing theme .js assets for =include / =require directives that resolve outside the theme's own asset directory.
References
- https://github.com/wintercms/winter/security/advisories/GHSA-58fp-mcx6-7qf9 — the LESS @import counterpart of this issue, which shares the same root cause and hardening approach. - https://github.com/wintercms/winter/security/advisories/GHSA-2x7r-93ww-cxrq (CVE-2023-52085) — earlier Local File Inclusion through LESS compilation.
Credit to Zyad Mohamed Elmahy (@elmahy111) for reporting the issue.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Email us at hello@wintercms.com
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
composer/winter/wn-system-moduleto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.2.13 - Upgrade
Upgrade
wintercms/winterto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in v1.2.13Patch e09c8d3526f3583cb6c3476a021b885088ecd4bd - Upgrade
Upgrade
wintercms/stormto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in v1.2.13Patch fd673f4f32140c97c68b1ed705764b819747fbdf - Configuration
As interim mitigation, remove the cms.manage_assets permission from any role that is not held by a fully trusted administrator or developer (permission is normally defaulted to the built-in Developer role).
Winter CMS cms.manage_assets permission = remove_from_untrusted_roles - Configuration
If you cannot upgrade, apply the referenced manual fixes from Winter Storm and Winter core: storm commit fd673f4f32140c97c68b1ed705764b819747fbdf and winter commit e09c8d3526f3583cb6c3476a021b885088ecd4bd.
Winter CMS / Winter Storm (if cannot upgrade) manual patch application = apply_commits - Compensating control
Audit existing theme .js assets for =include / =require directives that resolve outside the theme’s own asset directory, and remove/replace any such directives to prevent disclosure via the combine/{file} route.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What level of access does an attacker need to create a disclosure?
The attacker must be an authenticated backend user with the cms.manage_assets permission. This permission allows management of website assets such as images, JavaScript, and CSS files.
Can the disclosed file be accessed without logging in?
Yes. Once the manipulated JavaScript asset is referenced by a template, the combined output is served through the unauthenticated combine/{file} route and can be read by unauthenticated visitors at a stable URL.
What files can be disclosed?
An attacker can disclose arbitrary files readable by the PHP process, provided the target has a file extension. Targets without an extension have .js appended.
What condition is required before the malicious combined asset becomes publicly available?
The manipulated theme JavaScript asset must be referenced by a template. After that, its combined output can expose the included file through the public combine route.