GHSA-26w5-6g95-gj28: Path Traversal
Summary Atlantis versions >= 0.19.8 and < 0.45.0 did not consistently validate user-controlled workspace values before using them to construct local workspace paths.
A crafted workspace value containing path traversal segments could cause Atlantis to resolve workspace paths outside the intended per-pull workspace directory. In vulnerable versions or code paths, Atlantis could create, use, or remove/recreate out-of-bounds directories with the privileges of the Atlantis process user, before Terraform rejected the invalid workspace name.
The issue is fixed in Atlantis 0.45.0.
Details The issue is a path traversal vulnerability in Atlantis workspace handling. workspace values can be supplied through repository-level atlantis.yaml configuration accepted by the server or through authenticated API input. A value such as ../../../../../../../../tmp/f1-canary could escape the intended Atlantis workspace root.
In affected code paths, Atlantis used the resolved workspace path for local working-directory operations. For example, workspace values were joined into repo pull paths, and clone preparation paths could call directory removal/recreation operations such as os.RemoveAll and os.MkdirAll on the resolved directory.
PoC In a local PoC using repo-level atlantis.yaml, the following workspace value caused Atlantis to resolve and use /tmp/f1-canary outside ~/.atlantis/repos/...:
yaml version: 3 projects: - dir: . workspace: ../../../../../../../../tmp/f1-canary
Atlantis logs showed the out-of-bounds directory being created and Terraform being run with /tmp/f1-canary as the working directory. Terraform rejected the workspace name only after Atlantis had already used the out-of-bounds path.
Impact A user who can cause Atlantis to process a crafted workspace value, for example through repository-level atlantis.yaml configuration accepted by the server or an authenticated /api/plan request, may cause filesystem operations to occur outside the intended workspace boundary.
Depending on the affected version, code path, deployment configuration, and filesystem permissions, this may result in unintended directory creation, deletion, or reuse, integrity impact to writable local paths, or denial of service. Containerized deployments may limit host impact, but writable mounted volumes and persistent Atlantis data paths remain relevant.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
go/github.com/runatlantis/atlantisto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.45.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Atlantisto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.45.0 - Configuration
Update repository `atlantis.yaml` to set `projects[].workspace` to a valid workspace name that does not contain path traversal segments; e.g., avoid values like `../../../../../../../../tmp/f1-canary`.
Atlantis (repo-level atlantis.yaml) projects.workspace = (remove any path traversal segments such as "../../../../../../../../tmp/f1-canary") - Compensating control
Ensure untrusted users cannot control Atlantis `workspace` via repository-level `atlantis.yaml` or authenticated `/api/plan` requests (limit who can submit/manage `atlantis.yaml` and restrict access to `/api/plan` to trusted users).
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What access does an attacker need to supply a malicious workspace value?
The workspace value can be provided through repository-level atlantis.yaml configuration accepted by the server or through authenticated API input. Network reachability alone is not described as sufficient.
What could path traversal affect on the Atlantis host?
Affected code paths could create, use, remove, or recreate directories outside the intended per-pull workspace directory. These operations run with the privileges of the Atlantis process user.
Which versions should be remediated?
Atlantis versions from 0.19.8 up to, but not including, 0.45.0 are affected. The issue is fixed in version 0.45.0.