GHSA-2m6q-8v3h-jqww: Medium severity npm/@adonisjs/http-server vulnerability
Route parameters are inserted into generated URLs without URI encoding.
When an application passes untrusted input to a route whose first path segment is dynamic, a value beginning with / can produce a scheme-relative URL. For example:
ts router.get('/:page', handler).as('pages.show')
response.redirect().toRoute('pages.show', { page: '/evil.example.com', })
This generates the following redirect:
http Location: //evil.example.com
Browsers interpret this value as an external URL and redirect the user to https://evil.example.com.
Details
The shared createURL() helper is used by route URL builders, including Router.makeUrl() and Response.redirect().toRoute().
Route parameter values were appended without encoding:
ts if (isDefined) { uriSegments.push(${value}${token.end}) }
Wildcard parameters had the same behavior:
ts uriSegments.push(${values.join('/')}${token.end})
The issue does not affect APIs that intentionally accept complete redirect URLs. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled data as a route parameter and use the generated URL as a redirect destination.
Impact
An attacker may craft a link on a trusted application domain that redirects a victim to an attacker-controlled website.
This can facilitate phishing and may be chained with authentication or OAuth flows that rely on trusted redirect destinations.
Applications are affected when they: - define a route whose first path segment is dynamic; and - pass request-derived data to that segment when generating a redirect URL.
Patches
Route parameter values are now encoded using encodeURIComponent.
Wildcard values are encoded individually before being joined with /, preserving their intended segment separators:
ts if (isDefined) { uriSegments.push(${encodeURIComponent(String(value))}${token.end}) }
ts uriSegments.push( ${values.map((value) => encodeURIComponent(String(value))).join('/')}${token.end} )
With the fix, /evil.example.com becomes:
/%2Fevil.example.com
Fixes targeting v6 and v7 have been published below. - https://github.com/adonisjs/http-server/releases/tag/v8.2.3 - https://github.com/adonisjs/http-server/releases/tag/v9.3.0
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@adonisjs/http-serverto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 8.2.3 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@adonisjs/http-serverto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 9.3.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
adonisjs/http-serverto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 8.2.3 - Upgrade
Upgrade
adonisjs/http-serverto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 9.3.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which applications are exposed to this issue?
Applications are exposed when they pass attacker-controlled data as a parameter to a route whose first path segment is dynamic, then use the generated route URL as a redirect destination. A parameter value beginning with a slash can cause the generated URL to be interpreted by browsers as an external destination.
Does this affect redirect APIs that are designed to accept complete URLs?
No. APIs that intentionally accept complete redirect URLs are not affected by this issue.
What can be done if an update cannot be applied immediately?
Do not pass untrusted input as a route parameter when the generated URL will be used for a redirect, especially for routes with a dynamic first path segment. Validate or constrain such values so they cannot begin with a slash.