GHSA-34r4-95hx-gxqr: Yeti: Unauthenticated Access to Full Audit Timeline Discloses All Threat Intelligence Data
Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI registers the audit router without Depends(auth.getcurrentactiveuser), and core/web/apiv2/audit.py does not perform a route-level authentication check for /api/v2/audit/timeline/{id}. An unauthenticated network attacker can use an empty, partial, or specific wildcard path to query TimelineLog records containing the actor, targetid, action, and details fields, including analyst usernames, object identifiers and values, and before-and-after object data. This exposes the operational history of threat-intelligence objects while other application routers require authentication. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
YETIto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.5.1
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to this issue?
Any Yeti instance reachable by an unauthenticated network client is exposed if it is running a version earlier than 2.5.1. No account or user interaction is required.
What can an attacker obtain?
An attacker can query audit TimelineLog records and obtain actor names, target identifiers, actions, details, object values, and before-and-after object data. This can disclose analyst usernames and the operational history of threat-intelligence objects.
How does exploitation work?
The affected audit timeline endpoint can be queried with an empty, partial, or specific wildcard path. The audit router lacks the authentication dependency and the route does not perform its own authentication check.
What should be done to remediate the issue?
Upgrade Yeti to version 2.5.1, which fixes the missing authentication protection. If immediate patching is not possible, restrict unauthenticated network access to the affected API endpoint.