GHSA-58g7-7f52-h92c: XSS
Impact The edit mode fullscreen labels are parsed as HTML when the corresponding control is rendered. An attacker who controls the Dashboards language options can supply markup carrying event handlers, which then execute in the origin of the page hosting the dashboard. Exploitation requires that untrusted data reach the Dashboards language configuration and that the affected control be rendered. Script running this way has the same access to page data, storage and session state as the hosting application.
Workarounds
Until you can upgrade, replace Fullscreen.prototype.setButtonText atapplication startup. The replacement is the original method with textContent in place of innerHTML.
If you install Dashboards from npm
Import the module once, before any board is created.
js import Fullscreen from '@highcharts/dashboards/es-modules/Dashboards/EditMode/Fullscreen.js';
Fullscreen.prototype.setButtonText = function () { const editMode = this.board.editMode, button = editMode?.tools.contextMenu?.items.viewFullscreen;
if (button?.innerElement) { const lang = editMode.lang;
button.innerElement.textContent = (this.isOpen ? lang.exitFullscreen : lang.viewFullscreen) || ''; } };
If you load Dashboards from a <script> tag
The same replacement, taking Fullscreen from the global namespace. It must run after modules/layout and before any board is created.
html <script src="https://code.highcharts.com/dashboards/dashboards.js"></script> <script src="https://code.highcharts.com/dashboards/modules/layout.js"></script> <script> { const Fullscreen = window.Dashboards?.Fullscreen;
Fullscreen.prototype.setButtonText = function () { const editMode = this.board.editMode, button = editMode?.tools.contextMenu?.items.viewFullscreen;
if (button?.innerElement) { const lang = editMode.lang;
button.innerElement.textContent = (this.isOpen ? lang.exitFullscreen : lang.viewFullscreen) || ''; } }; } </script>
If your application does not need Edit Mode, leaving it disabled (editMode.enabled: false) removes the exposure as well. The same applies to the context menu — the label is only reachable when viewFullscreen is among editMode.contextMenu.items.
Obtaining the patched version The patched releases are available from all the usual distribution channels. With npm, upgrade the affected package to the patched version listed above, for example npm install @highcharts/dashboards@4.2.3. If you load Highcharts Dashboards from a CDN, use a versioned URL, for example https://code.highcharts.com/dashboards/4.2.3/dashboards.js. For more on each installation method, see the installation guide.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@highcharts/dashboardsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.2.3 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@highcharts/dashboardsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.2.3 - Configuration
Leave Edit Mode disabled if the application does not need it.
Highcharts Dashboards editMode.enabled = false - Compensating control
Until upgrading, replace Fullscreen.prototype.setButtonText at application startup, using textContent in place of innerHTML.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to this issue?
Applications using npm/@highcharts/dashboards are exposed when they render the affected edit-mode fullscreen control and allow untrusted input to influence the Dashboards language configuration.
What does an attacker need to exploit it?
An attacker must be able to supply markup through the Dashboards language options. The affected fullscreen control must then be rendered for event handlers in that markup to execute.
What can I do if I cannot upgrade immediately?
At application startup, before any board is created, replace Fullscreen.prototype.setButtonText with a version that assigns the fullscreen label using textContent rather than innerHTML. This prevents label markup from being interpreted as HTML.