GHSA-5h23-36rv-pm65: Input Validation
Summary
File.GetStyle indexes the fill, border and font tables with values taken straight out of xl/styles.xml, and the conditions gating those lookups check only the upper bound. A workbook whose cellXfs entry carries fillId="-1", borderId="-1" or fontId="-1" reaches a negative slice index and panics. excelize has no recover(), so the panic leaves GetStyle and takes the calling process with it.
Same defect class as GHSA-48hm-4h8j-58fg, the negative shared-string index, in a different file. That one was fixed by adding the missing lower bound; these three sites still lack it.
Where it is
styles.go, in GetStyle, lines 1683, 1686 and 1689:
go xf := s.CellXfs.Xf[idx] if extractStyleCondFuncs"fill" { f.extractFills(s.Fills.Fill[xf.FillID], s, style) } if extractStyleCondFuncs"border" { f.extractBorders(s.Borders.Border[xf.BorderID], s, style) } if extractStyleCondFuncs"font" { style.Font = extractFont(s.Fonts.Font[xf.FontID]) }
The conditions, at lines 1171 to 1185, bound only the top:
go "fill": func(xf xlsxXf, s xlsxStyleSheet) bool { return (xf.ApplyFill == nil || (xf.ApplyFill != nil && xf.ApplyFill)) && xf.FillID != nil && s.Fills != nil && xf.FillID < len(s.Fills.Fill) },
xf.FillID < len(...) is satisfied by any negative value. FillID, BorderID and FontID are int unmarshalled directly from the fillId, borderId and fontId attributes, so the value is whatever the file says. The border and font conditions have the same shape.
The correct pattern is already in the same function, six lines above at 1677:
go if idx < 0 || s.CellXfs == nil || len(s.CellXfs.Xf) <= idx { return style, newInvalidStyleID(idx) }
and again at 1783. So the style index itself is guarded on both sides while the three ids it leads to are not.
Proof of concept
Executed against master at f98df08, which is the merge of #2366, so this is current rather than historical. The harness builds a normal styled workbook with excelize, rewrites one attribute of the cellXfs entry inside the zip to -1, reopens it and calls GetCellStyle then GetStyle:
control (all >= 0) ok style=true err=<nil> fillId=-1 PANIC: runtime error: index out of range [-1] borderId=-1 PANIC: runtime error: index out of range [-1] fontId=-1 PANIC: runtime error: index out of range [-1]
The control confirms the harness reads a valid file correctly, so the three panics are the negative ids rather than a broken fixture. Worth mentioning because my first attempt at this harness patched only fillId and appeared to show the other two were fine; they are not, the replacement had simply missed them.
Impact
Any application that opens an untrusted .xlsx and reads cell styling crashes. GetStyle is reached through GetCellStyle and from the style-copying and rendering paths, so it sits on the ordinary read path. With no recover() anywhere in excelize, a CLI or worker exits and a service returns 500 per request unless the caller installed its own recovery middleware.
No memory corruption and no information disclosure. Availability only.
Suggested fix
Add the lower bound to each of the three conditions, matching what line 1677 already does for the style index:
go xf.FillID >= 0 && xf.FillID < len(s.Fills.Fill)
and the same for BorderID and FontID. Three one-line changes in extractStyleCondFuncs.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
go/github.com/xuri/excelize/v2to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.11.1-0.20260731010303-ae2113b410e5 - Compensating control
In excelize's `extractStyleCondFuncs`, add lower-bound checks to the `fill`, `border`, and `font` conditions so they require `*xf.FillID >= 0`, `*xf.BorderID >= 0`, and `*xf.FontID >= 0` in addition to the existing upper-bound checks, matching the guarded style-index pattern.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which applications are realistically exposed to this issue?
Applications using excelize that call GetStyle on attacker-controlled or otherwise untrusted Excel workbooks are exposed. A malformed style entry can cause a panic that terminates the calling process because excelize does not recover from it.
What must an attacker supply to trigger the denial of service?
The attacker needs a workbook whose xl/styles.xml cellXfs entry contains a negative fillId, borderId, or fontId, such as -1. When GetStyle processes that entry, the negative value can be used as a slice index and panic.
What is the security impact beyond process availability?
The provided severity vector indicates high availability impact, with no confidentiality or integrity impact. Exploitation is network-reachable, requires no privileges, and requires user interaction according to the supplied vector.