GHSA-5m22-7pfq-vp65: Medium severity npm/apostrophe vulnerability
Review scope and evidence limits
Package: @apostrophecms/import-export, version 3.7.0.
Release tag reviewed: @apostrophecms/import-export@3.7.0, commit 9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce (September 30, 2026).
Current main reviewed: 5ce3732be0ebdebb4db0f8ef160c81e8671157e6.
The importer, gzip extractor, import permission gate, and core permission implementation have no differences between that release tag and the reviewed main. This follow-up is a static remediation review. We have not repeated the original end-to-end reproductions against the latest release or tested a deployed site. Current exploitability and impact therefore still require maintainer validation; the observations below establish that the reported security checks remain absent in public source. The original emailed PDF contains the original reproduction material.
Import API bypasses publication roles for protected content
The import gate in canImportOrExport() checks the type's import configuration and view permission. The write helpers then call document-manager insert/update directly, including operations on published variants. We did not find the normal publish permission check or beforePublish transition in these helpers. Core permissions intentionally distinguish editRole and publishRole, and the ordinary publication lifecycle enforces that distinction.
The reported security boundary is a content type that an editor may edit but whose publication is reserved for a stronger role. Direct public-state changes through import must enforce the same publication authority. The original report describes unauthorized creation, replacement, or removal of published content under that configuration.
Suggested remediation: centralize authorization for import writes; require publish permission for every non-autopublished published variant, authorize each concrete target, and preflight the complete import before persistent changes. Preserve authorized draft imports and the intended behavior of autopublished types.
Source references: - Import write helpers - Import permission gate - Core role distinctions - Core insert/update/publication permission hooks
Coordination
Vivek R / Winfunc Original reporting team: Mufeed VH / Winfunc
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/apostropheto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.34.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@apostrophecms/import-exportto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.7.1 - Compensating control
In @apostrophecms/import-export, centralize authorization for import writes: require publish permission for every non-autopublished published variant, authorize each concrete target, and preflight the complete import before making persistent changes; preserve authorized draft imports and the intended behavior of autopublished types.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which users can exploit this issue?
An attacker needs network access and an existing account with the affected type's import capability and view permission. The reviewed import gate does not enforce the normal publish permission before writing published document variants.
Is user interaction required, and what is the primary impact?
No user interaction is required. The reported impact is unauthorized modification of protected published content; the provided vector reports integrity impact only, with no confidentiality or availability impact.
Are current public sources known to contain the missing checks?
The review found no differences in the importer, gzip extractor, import permission gate, or core permission implementation between version 3.7.0 and the reviewed main branch. The reviewers reported that the relevant publish-permission checks remain absent in public source, but did not retest exploitation against a deployed site.