GHSA-5w7r-f4cg-rqq7: Medium severity go/github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel vulnerability

Published Sep 4, 2026
·
Updated

CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72799.

Summary

Five filetree endpoints resolve arbitrary document IDs and paths with no publish-access check of any kind. All are CheckAuth-only, so they are reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. An anonymous reader can map the complete private document tree every notebook, folder, and document title, and which notebook holds each document for documents marked hidden, password-protected, or publish-forbidden, and can resolve titles to document IDs.

Details

None of the following handlers invokes IsReadOnlyRoleContext, CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess, or CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore:

| Endpoint | Returns | Discloses | |---|---|---| | getFullHPathByID (router 159) | GetFullHPathByID(id) | full title path including notebook, e.g. /MySecretNotebook/Confidential/Q3 Layoffs Plan | | getHPathByID (router 157) | GetHPathByID(id) | document-relative title path | | getPathByID (router 158) | {path, notebook} | which notebook a document lives in, plus its .sy storage path | | getIDsByHPath (router 160) | GetIDsByHPath(path, notebook) | title-path → document-ID enumeration | | getHPathByPath (router 155) | HPath from a storage path | title path from a storage path |

Each accepts an arbitrary ID or HPath and resolves it identically for hidden, publish-forbidden, and password-protected documents.

This enables two operations for an unauthenticated caller: 1. Map the private document tree: getFullHPathByID and getPathByID yield every notebook/folder/document title and its containing notebook. 2. Resolve titles to IDs: getIDsByHPath converts a known or guessed title path into document IDs, which are the required input for other block-read endpoints.

Document titles and HPaths are precisely the block metadata that the project's block-metadata restriction (commit ffde3b21e) set out to protect; that change gated getBlockInfo, getDocInfo, and getDocsInfo but left this entire path-resolution family open.

Guarded-sibling asymmetry. getRecentDocs (FilterRecentDocsByPublishAccess), getCriteria (FilterCriteriaByPublishAccess), and getLocalStorage (FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess) all filter document references for reader sessions. The codebase clearly publish-scopes reader-visible metadata elsewhere; these five endpoints do not.

Verified at origin/master (eef105683): all five handler bodies contain no publish-access call; the storage-family siblings contain their filters; all five routes are registered CheckAuth without CheckAdminRole.

Proof of Concept

Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, otherwise any publish reader account. A document exists in a notebook marked publish-forbidden or password-protected.

Resolve a private document's full title path: POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getFullHPathByID {"id":"<DOCID>"} → /MySecretNotebook/Confidential/Q3 Layoffs Plan

Identify its notebook and storage path: POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getPathByID {"id":"<DOCID>"} → {"path":"/....sy","notebook":"<BOXID>"}

Enumerate IDs from a title path: POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getIDsByHPath {"path":"/Confidential","notebook":"<BOXID>"} → document IDs under a folder the reader cannot otherwise access

Each returns data for documents excluded from publishing; no password or membership is required.

Impact

An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader can enumerate the complete private document structure: notebook names, folder hierarchy, and document titles for content the administrator marked hidden, password-protected, or excluded from publishing. Document titles alone are frequently sensitive (project names, personnel actions, client identifiers). The ID-resolution direction additionally supplies valid document IDs, removing the "attacker must know an ID" precondition for other block-read endpoints. Confidentiality-only.

Suggested fix

For IsReadOnlyRoleContext sessions, gate each of the five handlers with CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess (or restrict resolution to publish-visible documents), mirroring the treatment already applied in getRecentDocs, getCriteria, and getLocalStorage.

Affected Software

1 affected componentFixes available
go/github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel<0.0.0-20260724112156-5bae0926b896
0.0.0-20260724112156-5bae0926b896

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade go/github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.0.0-20260724112156-5bae0926b896
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade codebase commit to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Patch ffde3b21e
  3. Configuration

    For the five handlers that resolve notebook/folder/document title paths and IDs—POST /api/filetree/getFullHPathByID, POST /api/filetree/getIDsByHPath, POST /api/filetree/getPathByID (and the other storage-family siblings mentioned alongside them)—gate the handler logic with CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess (or otherwise restrict resolution to publish-visible documents). This mirrors the existing publish-access filtering already used by getRecentDocs (FilterRecentDocsByPublishAccess), getCriteria (FilterCriteriaByPublishAccess), and getLocalStorage (FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess).

    filetree endpoints (publish path-resolution family) Authorization gating = Add CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess (or restrict to publish-visible documents)
  4. Configuration

    In sessions using IsReadOnlyRoleContext, ensure each of the five filetree path-resolution handlers performs CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess (or equivalent restriction) before returning any notebook/folder/document metadata or IDs.

    filetree routes (CheckAuth-only) Publish-access enforcement for IsReadOnlyRoleContext sessions = Apply publish-access checks

Event History

Sep 4, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·08:53 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·08:53 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who can access the affected endpoints?

The endpoints are protected only by CheckAuth. They are reachable with a publish RoleReader token and, when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, by the anonymous account.

2

What information can an attacker obtain?

An attacker can enumerate the private document tree, including notebook, folder, and document titles, and identify which notebook contains each document. This includes documents marked hidden, password-protected, or publish-forbidden, and allows titles to be resolved to document IDs.

3

What access checks are missing from these handlers?

The affected handlers do not invoke IsReadOnlyRoleContext, CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess, or CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore. As a result, publish-access restrictions are not enforced for the described ID and path resolution operations.

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