GHSA-6gw6-rv2g-25mg: Path Traversal
Impact
When generating an API plugin manifest from an attacker-controlled or compromised OpenAPI description, Kiota copies x-ai-capabilities.responsesemantics.oauthcardpath into the manifest without validating that it is a safe package-relative file reference. An attacker can supply parent-directory traversal, rooted paths, or absolute URIs instead of a card file within the plugin package.
The unsafe reference is propagated into the generated manifest. Its security effect depends on the downstream host's handling of the reference when the plugin is packaged and deployed. This is not local code execution or a file read performed by Kiota merely during generation. A consuming host that resolves the untrusted reference can cross the intended package boundary or use an unintended authentication card.
Affected versions
The affected NuGet packages are Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota and Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder, starting with version 1.25.1, which introduced this manifest field. The field remains unvalidated through version 1.34.1, including the separate 1.29.1 security-backport release. Version 1.35.0 fixes the issue.
Patches
Upgrade to Kiota 1.35.0 or later and regenerate affected plugin manifests. Kiota now applies the existing safe-file-reference validator to oauthcardpath, drops unsafe references, and emits a warning. Valid relative card paths remain supported.
- Fix: https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/pull/8055 - Fixed release: https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/releases/tag/v1.35.0
Workarounds
Generate plugins only from trusted, integrity-protected OpenAPI descriptions. Before packaging or deployment, review generated manifests and remove any oauthcardpath that is not a safe relative reference confined to the plugin package. Do not rely on validation of sibling manifest fields to validate this field.
Related advisories
GHSA-4jwf-m4wg-8p66 and GHSA-p5rm-jg5c-8c77 cover statictemplate.file. Their fixes do not enforce validation at the separate oauthcardpath emission site.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
nuget/Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builderto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.35.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
nuget/Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiotato a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.35.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota and Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builderto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.35.0 - Configuration
Before packaging or deployment, review generated manifests and remove any oauth_card_path that is not a safe relative reference confined to the plugin package.
Generated plugin manifest oauth_card_path = safe relative reference confined to the plugin package - Compensating control
Generate plugins only from trusted, integrity-protected OpenAPI descriptions.
- Operational
Regenerate affected plugin manifests after upgrading Kiota.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which Kiota package versions need remediation?
Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota and Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder are affected from version 1.25.1 through 1.34.1, including the separate 1.29.1 security-backport release. Version 1.35.0 fixes the issue.
What must be true for exploitation to matter?
A manifest must be generated from an attacker-controlled or compromised OpenAPI description that supplies x-ai-capabilities.response_semantics.oauth_card_path. A downstream host must then resolve the generated untrusted reference in a way that permits it to cross the intended package boundary or select an unintended authentication card.
Are generated manifests themselves a concern after upgrading?
Yes. The unsafe path is propagated into the generated manifest, so manifests produced by affected versions from untrusted descriptions may retain the unsafe reference. Upgrade to 1.35.0 or later and regenerate affected manifests.
Does generating a manifest with an affected version cause local code execution or file reads?
No. Kiota does not itself perform local code execution or read a file merely while generating the manifest. The security effect depends on how the consuming host handles the referenced path during packaging and deployment.