GHSA-72qq-p3r5-f7wq: XSS
Summary
The openUrl function in @a2ui/webcore passes an agent-controlled URL directly to window.open() without validating the URI scheme. A malicious agent can supply a javascript: URI as the url argument of a Button component's functionCall action. When the user clicks the rendered button, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the victim application's browser origin, constituting a stored/reflected XSS. No non-default configuration is required; the Basic Catalog is enabled by default.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the openUrl function implementation within the Basic Catalog of @a2ui/webcore (commit 23a003248abbf59da6c376ea64ace91d82d209ff).
Sink — renderers/webcore/src/v09/basiccatalog/functions/basicfunctions.ts:428-430:
ts export const OpenUrlImplementation = createFunctionImplementation(OpenUrlApi, args => { if (args.url && typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.open) { window.open(args.url, 'blank'); } });
window.open is called unconditionally with the agent-supplied args.url value. No scheme allowlist or blocklist is applied.
Insufficient schema validation — renderers/webcore/src/v09/basiccatalog/functions/basicfunctionsapi.ts:453-458:
ts export const OpenUrlApi = { name: 'openUrl' as const, returnType: 'void' as const, schema: z.object({ url: z.preprocess(v => (v === undefined ? undefined : String(v)), z.string()), }), };
The Zod schema only requires a string; javascript: URIs pass validation without any rejection.
Full source-to-sink data flow:
1. renderers/webcore/src/v09/basiccatalog/components/basiccomponents.ts:356 — ButtonApi accepts action: ActionSchema (entry point). 2. renderers/webcore/src/v09/schema/common-types.ts:126-130 — ActionSchema permits { functionCall: FunctionCallSchema }. 3. renderers/webcore/src/v09/rendering/generic-binder.ts:243-255 — on click, bound action calls resolveDeepSync then dispatchAction. 4. renderers/webcore/src/v09/rendering/data-context.ts:93-105 — resolveDynamicValue detects the call key and invokes the named function. 5. renderers/webcore/src/v09/catalog/types.ts:177-186 — catalog invoker runs fn.schema.parse(rawArgs) then fn.execute(). 6. renderers/webcore/src/v09/basiccatalog/functions/basicfunctionsapi.ts:453-458 — OpenUrlApi validates url as z.string() only (no scheme check). 7. renderers/webcore/src/v09/basiccatalog/functions/basicfunctions.ts:428-430 — sink: window.open(args.url, 'blank') executes the javascript: URI.
All three renderers implemented in the A2UI repository are affected:
- React: renderers/react/src/v09/catalog/basic/components/Button.tsx:33 — onClick={props.action} - Lit: renderers/lit/src/v09/catalogs/basic/components/Button.ts:112 — @click=${() => props.action()} - Angular: renderers/angular/src/v09/catalog/basic/button.component.ts:103-110 — handleClick() → dataContext.resolveAction → dispatchAction
Any other A2UI renderer which depends on webcore and uses its basic catalog implementation is also affected.
Remediation
The issue was fixed in https://github.com/a2ui-project/a2ui/pull/1707 and released in web\core version 0.10.2, by blocking URLs that do not use the HTTP or HTTPS schemes, or those that are invalid.
Please fix this issue in your project by depending on a @a2ui/web\core version equal or greater than 0.10.2.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@a2ui/web_coreto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.10.2 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@a2ui/web_coreto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.10.2
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which applications are exposed in practice?
Applications using @a2ui/web_core’s Basic Catalog are exposed when they render a Button component whose functionCall action invokes openUrl with an agent-controlled URL. The Basic Catalog is enabled by default, so no non-default configuration is required.
What does an attacker need to trigger exploitation?
An attacker needs to cause a malicious agent-controlled URL, such as a javascript: URI, to be supplied as the url argument for a Button functionCall action. The victim must click the rendered button for the JavaScript to execute in the application’s browser origin.
How can I identify a vulnerable implementation?
Inspect the Basic Catalog openUrl implementation in renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions.ts. An implementation that passes args.url directly to window.open(args.url, '_blank') without URI-scheme validation is affected.