GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9: Critical severity go/github.com/kyverno/kyverno vulnerability
Summary
In Kyverno v1.18.1, a tenant who can create a NamespacedMutatingPolicy in their own namespace can instruct the admission controller to generate resources in any namespace by passing an arbitrary namespace string to the CEL generator.apply(namespace, resources) function.
Details
pkg/cel/libs/context.go:177 declares GenerateResources(namespace string, dataList []map[string]any). The namespace argument arrives unvalidated from the CEL expression generator.apply("<target-namespace>", [...]).
Version-Specific Impact
v1.18.0, v1.18.1 (affected via NamespacedMutatingPolicy only):
The nmpol CEL compiler unintentionally exposes the generator library to match condition expressions. A namespaced mutating policy can invoke generator.apply() in a boolean CEL expression such as matchConditions, triggering the admission controller to generate resources in any namespace at request time. This side effect executes with the admission controller's cluster-wide privileges.
NamespacedGeneratingPolicy is not a vector in v1.18.1 due to incomplete webhook and background processing wiring (not registered or functional).
Root Cause
The admission validator for NamespacedMutatingPolicy (pkg/cel/policies/mpol/validate.go) only checks that the policy compiles and does not enforce namespace scope on generator.apply() arguments.
Compare correctly-guarded equivalents: pkg/engine/context/loaders/configmap.go:102 rejects cross-namespace ConfigMap references for namespaced policies, and pkg/engine/apicall/apicall.go:73-82 enforces namespace segment matching. GenerateResources has neither guard.
Proof of Concept
Prerequisites: namespace tenant-ns exists; attacker has create on namespacedmutatingpolicies.policies.kyverno.io in tenant-ns.
yaml apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1beta1 kind: NamespacedMutatingPolicy metadata: name: cross-ns-escalate namespace: tenant-ns spec: matchConstraints: resourceRules: - apiGroups: [""] apiVersions: ["v1"] resources: ["configmaps"] operations: ["CREATE"] mutations: - patchType: applyConfiguration applyConfiguration: expression: object matchConditions: - name: trigger-escalation expression: | generator.apply("kube-system", [ { "apiVersion": dyn("v1"), "kind": dyn("ConfigMap"), "metadata": dyn({ "name": "kube-system-config", "namespace": "kube-system" }), "data": dyn({ "injected-by": "tenant-policy", "impact": "unauthorized access to kube-system namespace" }) } ])
Apply the policy, then create any ConfigMap in tenant-ns to trigger the admission webhook. The admission controller creates configmap/kube-system-config in kube-system. By default, the admission controller has create on ConfigMaps in all namespaces.
Impact
A namespace-scoped user with create on NamespacedMutatingPolicy in >=v1.18.1 can create ConfigMaps, NetworkPolicies, Secrets, and other resources in any namespace using the admission controller's cluster-wide RBAC. This allows:
Injecting sensitive configuration into protected namespaces (e.g., kube-system, default) Disrupting cluster networking via NetworkPolicies Privilege escalation via RoleBinding creation (for roles the admission controller holds or lesser-privileged roles) Privilege escalation via RoleBinding creation in other namespaces Any installation that grants non-admin users access to NamespacedMutatingPolicy creation is affected.
Timeline
2026-05-20: Vulnerability reproduced on main 2026-07-13: CVE-2026-54523 / GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9 published 2026-07-22: Advisory clarified to document actual v1.18.1 attack vector (NamespacedMutatingPolicy in matchConditions, not NamespacedGeneratingPolicy)
Advisory Update
This advisory was updated to clarify the v1.18.1 attack surface. The nmpol vector in matchConditions was the reachable attack path in v1.18.1, while ngpol lacked end-to-end plumbing. The CVE, patched version, and CVSS score remain unchanged. Original report by @0xVijay.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
go/github.com/kyverno/kyvernoto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.18.2 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Patch CVE-2026-54523 / GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9 - Configuration
Remove the attacker-prerequisite permission so tenant-ns users cannot create NamespacedMutatingPolicy objects (namespacedmutatingpolicies.policies.kyverno.io) that enable generator.apply() cross-namespace resource generation.
Kyverno admission controller (NamespacedMutatingPolicy generator.apply namespace argument) Restrict creation of policies.kyverno.io/v1beta1 kind NamespacedMutatingPolicy = Disable granting non-admin users create on NamespacedMutatingPolicy (namespacedmutatingpolicies.policies.kyverno.io) in tenant-ns - Configuration
Since the advisory states that 'By default, the admission controller has create on ConfigMaps in all namespaces', change Kyverno RBAC so the admission controller cannot create ConfigMaps in protected namespaces like kube-system.
Kyverno admission controller Default admission controller RBAC for ConfigMaps = Restrict create on ConfigMaps in all namespaces to only required namespaces - Configuration
Ensure namespace-scoped validation rejects cross-namespace generator.apply() arguments for NamespacedMutatingPolicy (the advisory notes generator.apply() arguments arrive unvalidated from CEL matchConditions in v1.18.1).
Kyverno (CEL matchConditions generator.apply) generator.apply(namespace, resources) usage for NamespacedMutatingPolicy = Disallow/validate generator.apply() namespace to prevent creating resources in arbitrary namespaces (e.g., kube-system)
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which Kyverno versions and policy types are affected?
The issue affects Kyverno v1.18.0 and v1.18.1 through NamespacedMutatingPolicy. NamespacedGeneratingPolicy is not an exploitation vector in v1.18.1 because its webhook and background processing wiring is incomplete and it is not registered or functional.
What access does an attacker need?
An attacker needs permission to create a NamespacedMutatingPolicy in their own namespace. They can then invoke generator.apply() from a boolean CEL expression, such as a matchConditions expression, and provide an arbitrary target namespace.
How much access can successful exploitation provide?
The generated-resource operation executes using the admission controller's cluster-wide privileges. This allows a tenant to cause resource generation in namespaces outside the namespace where they can create the policy.