GHSA-7hgx-277f-7vmg: Npm/n8n vulnerability
Impact
A workflow's "This workflow can be called by" setting was enforced by the Execute Workflow node but was not consulted when the same workflow was attached to an Agent as a tool. A user who could build an Agent could therefore call a workflow that its owner had restricted, and read back what it returned. The patch applies the sub-workflow caller policy on the Agent tool path.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.37.7 and 2.38.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. - Audit workflows attached as Agent tools and review their caller policy settings. - Remove sensitive workflows from Agent tool configurations until the instance is patched.
These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/n8nto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.37.7 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/n8nto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.38.2 - Upgrade
Upgrade
n8nto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.37.7 - Upgrade
Upgrade
n8nto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.38.2 - Configuration
Until patched, audit workflows attached as Agent tools and review their caller policy settings, since the vulnerability is that the workflow’s "_This workflow can be called by_" setting was not consulted on the Agent tool path.
n8n Agent tool configurations workflow caller policy enforcement on Agent tool path = Apply caller policy to sub-workflow executions via Agent tools (Execute Workflow node path) - Configuration
Until the instance is patched, remove sensitive workflows from Agent tool configurations so they cannot be called via an Agent tool.
n8n Agent tool configurations sensitive workflow attachment to Agent tools = Remove until patched - Compensating control
Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only as a short-term mitigation.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue?
A user who can build an Agent can exploit it when a workflow with a restricted caller policy is attached to that Agent as a tool. The user can call that workflow through the Agent and read its returned data.
Are restricted workflow caller policies enforced for Agent tools?
In affected versions, no. The caller policy was enforced through the Execute Workflow node but was not consulted when the workflow was invoked as an Agent tool.
Which versions contain the fix?
Upgrade n8n to version 2.37.7, 2.38.2, or a later version to remediate the issue.
What can administrators do before upgrading?
Limit instance access to fully trusted users, audit workflows configured as Agent tools and their caller policies, and remove sensitive workflows from Agent tool configurations. These are temporary mitigations and do not fully remediate the risk.