GHSA-7hp6-4w63-5g45: Pip/litellm vulnerability

Q: What access does an attacker need to exploit this issue?

The attacker must already be authenticated as a user with internal_user privileges. They can then request an API key with crafted metadata, use the returned encrypted value as a bearer token, and obtain proxy_admin access.

Q: What is the impact after privilege escalation?

A successful attacker gains full proxy administrative access and can execute arbitrary commands on the host through the MCP stdio endpoint.

Q: What can be done if an upgrade cannot be performed immediately?

Set EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=false to disable the vulnerable authentication path. This workaround breaks CLI SSO and Claude Code gateway login.

Published Oct 27, 2026

Summary

An authenticated user with internaluser privileges can escalate to proxyadmin and achieve remote code execution. The proxy uses one encryption key for two purposes: sealing secrets at rest and minting session tokens. An attacker exploits this by requesting a new API key with a crafted metadata field containing a forged admin credential as the "secret" value. The proxy encrypts and returns this payload. When this value is then presented as a bearer token, the proxy decrypts it, trusts the forged admin identity, and grants full administrative access, including the ability to execute arbitrary commands via the MCP stdio endpoint.

Affected versions

Versions later than 1.91.0 are exploitable in the default configuration. Versions 1.87.0 through 1.90.x are exploitable only if EXPERIMENTALUILOGIN=true was explicitly set.

Mitigation

Upgrade to a patched version as soon as possible.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, set EXPERIMENTALUILOGIN=false. This disables the vulnerable authentication path but also breaks CLI SSO and Claude Code gateway login.

Impact

An internal user can escalate to proxy admin and execute arbitrary commands on the host.

Discovery Credit: Hoa X. Nguyen (OPSWAT Unit 515)

Affected Software

5 affected componentsFixes available

pip/litellm>=1.104.0rc1<1.104.0rc2

1.104.0rc2

pip/litellm>=1.103.0<1.103.1

1.103.1

pip/litellm>=1.102.0<1.102.2

1.102.2

pip/litellm>=1.101.0<1.101.3

1.101.3

pip/litellm>=1.91.0<1.100.4

1.100.4

Frequently Asked Questions

Which deployments are affected by default?

Versions later than 1.91.0 are exploitable in the default configuration. Versions 1.87.0 through 1.90.x are affected only when EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=true was explicitly enabled.

What access does an attacker need to exploit this issue?

The attacker must already be authenticated as a user with internal_user privileges. They can then request an API key with crafted metadata, use the returned encrypted value as a bearer token, and obtain proxy_admin access.

What is the impact after privilege escalation?

A successful attacker gains full proxy administrative access and can execute arbitrary commands on the host through the MCP stdio endpoint.

What can be done if an upgrade cannot be performed immediately?

Set EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=false to disable the vulnerable authentication path. This workaround breaks CLI SSO and Claude Code gateway login.

GHSA-7hp6-4w63-5g45: Pip/litellm vulnerability

Affected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

Which deployments are affected by default?

What access does an attacker need to exploit this issue?

What is the impact after privilege escalation?

What can be done if an upgrade cannot be performed immediately?

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Frequently Asked Questions

Which deployments are affected by default?

What access does an attacker need to exploit this issue?

What is the impact after privilege escalation?

What can be done if an upgrade cannot be performed immediately?