GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf: Path Traversal
Summary Flowise on current main allows an authenticated user with documentStores:preview-process permission to trigger the S3 Directory document loader with attacker-controlled S3 object keys. The loader joins each returned S3 key with a temporary directory using path.join(tempDir, key) and writes the object bytes to disk without validating traversal sequences such as ../. Cleanup later removes only the original temporary directory, so files written outside that directory persist on the host filesystem. This yields arbitrary file write with the privileges of the Flowise server process. A related variant exists in the S3File loader when fileProcessingMethod = unstructured (same root cause; its cleanup behavior turns it into a mixed arbitrary write/delete/DoS primitive). ## Affected component - packages/components/nodes/documentloaders/S3Directory/S3Directory.ts - line 191: filePath = path.join(tempDir, key) (unsanitized) - line 213: recursive mkdirSync creates parent path - line 216: writeFileSync writes attacker-controlled bytes - line 289: cleanup only removes the original tempDir, so escaped files remain on disk - Related (variant): packages/components/nodes/documentloaders/S3File/S3File.ts (lines 756, 780, 782, 817 — arbitrary write + recursive dirname delete) ## Reachability - Routes exposed: packages/server/src/routes/documentstore/index.ts:41,45 (/api/v1/document-store/loader/preview, /api/v1/document-store/loader/process/:loaderId) - Both require documentStores:preview-process - packages/server/src/services/documentstore/index.ts:588 passes data.loaderConfig straight to the loader node with no path sanitization - S3Directory accepts a custom serverUrl, so the attacker does not need access to an existing trusted AWS bucket — they can point Flowise at a local MinIO or any S3-compatible endpoint they control ## Impact - Authenticated arbitrary file write to any path writable by the Flowise process - Destructive overwrite of application data, secrets, or configuration - Deployment-dependent lift to RCE if the service account can modify executable, startup, or interpreter-loaded files (e.g. .bashrc, systemd units, cron files, require.resolve targets, package.json postinstall scripts). This is not guaranteed product-wide. ## Preconditions - Flowise instance running (HTTP server mode) - Attacker has a workspace account with the documentStores:preview-process role - No additional infrastructure required — serverUrl can point to attacker-controlled S3-compatible endpoint ## Proof of Concept 1. Authenticate as a user with documentStores:preview-process 2. Run an S3-compatible server the attacker controls (e.g. MinIO) 3. Create an object with a traversal key such as: ../../../../tmp/flowise-poc.txt 4. Trigger: POST /api/v1/document-store/loader/preview (or /api/v1/document-store/loader/process/:loaderId) body: { "loaderId": "s3Directory", "loaderConfig": { "serverUrl": "http://attacker-minio:9000", "bucketName": "attacker-bucket", "prefix": "", "credential": "" } } 5. Observe that Flowise writes the object bytes to the escaped path 6. Observe that cleanup removes only the original temp directory; the escaped file persists Local reproduction confirmed: writing a key containing ../../escape-target/poc.txt from a nested temp root created the file outside the temp directory, and the cleanup removed only tempDir. ## Root Cause The loader trusts S3 object keys as safe local relative paths. It should canonicalize the destination with path.resolve(...), verify the resolved path remains within the intended temp directory, and reject traversal or absolute-path patterns before any directory creation or file write. ## Suggested Remediation The repository already has shared path validators that are not used here: - packages/components/src/validator.ts:35 defines traversal checks - packages/components/src/validator.ts:295 defines sanitizeFileName Recommended fix: 1. Replace path.join(tempDir, key) with a resolve-and-verify flow 2. Reject any resolved path outside tempDir 3. Prefer a sanitized basename if directory structure is not required 4. Apply the same fix to the S3File loader (fileProcessingMethod = unstructured branch)
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/flowiseto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.1.3 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/flowise-componentsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.1.3
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf?
The severity of GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf is rated at 63.
How do I fix GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf?
To fix GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf, update to the latest version of npm/flowise or npm/flowise-components that addresses this vulnerability.
What type of vulnerability is GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf?
GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf is classified as a Path Traversal vulnerability.
Who is affected by GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf?
Authenticated users with documentStores:preview-process permission in Flowise are affected by GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf.
What can an attacker do with GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf?
An attacker can trigger the S3 Directory document loader using attacker-controlled S3 object keys.