GHSA-8m5v-wh4r-5j96: Pipelines-as-code: openshift-pipelines-operator-rh: pipelines-as-code: repository users can trigger namespace edit-equivalent execution via auto-provisioned pipeline serviceaccount
A flaw was found in OpenShift Pipelines-as-Code (PAC). PAC does not verify whether the creator of a Repository custom resource has permission to create PipelineRuns. A namespace user with only Repository and Secret create/delete permissions can cause PAC to execute attacker-controlled PipelineRuns as the auto-provisioned pipeline ServiceAccount, which carries ClusterRole/edit by default. This results in namespace-scoped privilege escalation, enabling Secret read, resource creation/modification/deletion, and potential supply chain injection in CI/CD namespaces.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What level of access is sufficient to exploit this issue?
A namespace user needs permission to create and delete Repository custom resources and Secrets. They do not need permission to create PipelineRuns themselves.
Is the automatically provisioned pipeline identity affected by default?
Yes. The auto-provisioned pipeline ServiceAccount has the ClusterRole/edit role by default, allowing its PipelineRuns to act with edit-equivalent permissions in the namespace.
What could an attacker do after triggering execution?
The attacker can read Secrets and create, modify, or delete namespace resources. In CI/CD namespaces, this can also enable supply-chain injection.