GHSA-8pqf-f4m5-798g: Medium severity pip/Twisted vulnerability

Summary wildcardToRegexp() in twisted/mail/imap4.py converts IMAP LIST/LSUB wildcard patterns to Python regular expressions. It substitutes the two IMAP wildcards ( → (?:.?) and % → (?:(?:[^\\/])?)) but passes every other character through unchanged to re.compile(). This means that an authenticated IMAP client can send a quoted pattern string containing arbitrary regex syntax - including catastrophic-backtracking constructs such as (a+)+z.

Because Twisted runs a cooperative, single-threaded reactor, a blocking regex match freezes all I/O on the server for the duration of the match.

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Vulnerable Code

twisted/mail/imap4.py

python line 4595 def wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, delim=None): wildcard = wildcard.replace("", "(?:.?)") if delim is None: wildcard = wildcard.replace("%", "(?:.?)") else: wildcard = wildcard.replace("%", "(?:(?:[^%s])?)" % re.escape(delim)) return re.compile(wildcard, re.I) # ← user input compiled verbatim

python line 4993 class MemoryAccountWithoutNamespaces: def listMailboxes(self, ref, wildcard): ref = self.inferiorNames(parseMbox(ref.upper())) wildcard = wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, "/") # ← user-supplied wildcard return [(i, self.mailboxes[i]) for i in ref if wildcard.match(i)] ---

Proof of Concept

python from twisted.mail.imap4 import wildcardToRegexp import time

rx = wildcardToRegexp("(a+)+z", "/") for n in [20, 22, 24, 26, 28]: victim = "a" n t0 = time.perfcounter() rx.match(victim) print(f"n={n}: {time.perfcounter() - t0:.3f}s")

Output on Twisted 25.5.0:

[] Compiled regex: '(a+)+z' [] Note: metacharacters ( ) + ? are NOT escaped - they go straight to re.compile()

n time --- ---------- 20 0.153s 22 0.651s 24 2.941s 26 14.545s 28 55.019s

Timing doubles roughly every two characters (exponential growth), confirming catastrophic backtracking.

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Impact

Twisted's reactor is single-threaded and cooperative. A blocking re.match() call suspends the entire event loop - no other connection can be accepted, read, or written while the match runs. A single authenticated LIST command with a 28-character target mailbox name can stall the server for ~55 seconds.

An attacker who can register an account (or obtain credentials through other means) can:

1. CREATE a mailbox whose name is an exponential-blowup trigger string. 2. Issue LIST "" "(a+)+z" (or equivalent ReDoS pattern). 3. Repeat at ~1-minute intervals to keep the server permanently unavailable.

No exploit code or special privileges beyond an IMAP login are required.

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Fix

Escape non-wildcard characters before compiling:

python def wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, delim=None): # Split on the two IMAP wildcards, escape everything else parts = re.split(r'([%])', wildcard) result = [] for p in parts: if p == '': result.append('(?:.?)') elif p == '%': if delim is None: result.append('(?:.?)') else: result.append('(?:(?:[^%s])?)' % re.escape(delim)) else: result.append(re.escape(p)) # ← escape all other characters return re.compile(''.join(result), re.I)

Alternatively, apply re.escape() to the entire wildcard first, then substitute the (now-escaped) \ and \% tokens back with their regex equivalents.