GHSA-8rc2-428q-7ww3: XSS

Published Oct 28, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

When escapeParameter is enabled (escapeParameterHtml in the Legacy API), Vue I18n escapes the interpolation parameters before formatting a message. escapeParams() escapes either the list values or the named values, but not both: the two branches are joined by else. When a single call passes both, for example t(key, ['...'], { named: { ... } }), the named values reach the message without being escaped.

Details

escapeParams() in packages/core-base/src/translate.ts (v11.4.13):

ts function escapeParams(options: TranslateOptions) { if (isArray(options.list)) { options.list = options.list.map(item => (isString(item) ? escapeHtml(item) : item)) } else if (isObject(options.named)) { // ...escapes the named values } }

t(key, list, options) is a public overload, and TranslateOptions has a named field, so a call can carry both. The list is checked first, and the named values are then left as they are.

The translated string still goes through sanitizeTranslatedHtml() (added for CVE-2025-53892), which neutralizes event handler attributes and javascript: URLs. Other markup in the named values, such as links and forms, is inserted as is. Before the fix for GHSA-83rm-6c8r-g728, an <iframe srcdoc> in a named value also passes the sanitizer, and script runs. Versions without the sanitizer (before 9.14.5, 10.0.8 and 11.1.10, and 12.0.0-alpha.1 to alpha.3) insert the named values as HTML without any further check.

<i18n-t> is not affected: it passes either list or named values, never both, and it does not render translations as HTML.

PoC

js import { createI18n } from 'vue-i18n'

const i18n = createI18n({ legacy: false, locale: 'en', escapeParameter: true, messages: { en: { withList: '{0} {name}', withoutList: '{name}' } } }) const t = i18n.global.t

t('withoutList', { name: '<b>x</b>' }) // &lt;b&gt;x&lt;&#x2F;b&gt; escaped

t('withList', ['a'], { named: { name: '<b>x</b>' } }) // a <b>x</b> not escaped (v11.4.13)

Impact

Applications are affected when they enable escapeParameter, render translations as HTML (for example with v-html), and pass untrusted named values in the same call as a list. The named values are inserted as markup: phishing links, forms, or layout changes. Together with GHSA-83rm-6c8r-g728, or on versions without the sanitizer, this leads to script execution (DOM-based XSS).

Patches

Fixed in 11.4.14 and 12.0.0-alpha.5. escapeParams() now escapes both the list and the named values.

The fix also stops rewriting the named object that the caller passes. Before, the values of that object were replaced with their escaped form, so a second call with the same object escaped them twice.

v9 and v10 are no longer supported and will not be fixed. Please migrate to v11.

Workarounds

- Do not pass list and named values in the same call when escapeParameter is enabled. - Do not render translations that can contain untrusted values with v-html. Use component interpolation (<i18n-t>) instead.

Affected Software

10 affected componentsFixes available
npm/@intlify/vue-i18n-core>=12.0.0-alpha.1<12.0.0-alpha.5
12.0.0-alpha.5
npm/@intlify/vue-i18n-core>=9.2.0-alpha.7<11.4.14
11.4.14
npm/petite-vue-i18n>=12.0.0-alpha.1<12.0.0-alpha.5
12.0.0-alpha.5
npm/petite-vue-i18n>=9.2.0-alpha.7<11.4.14
11.4.14
npm/@intlify/core-base>=12.0.0-alpha.1<12.0.0-alpha.5
12.0.0-alpha.5
npm/@intlify/core-base>=9.0.0-beta.12<11.4.14
11.4.14
npm/@intlify/core>=12.0.0-alpha.1<12.0.0-alpha.5
12.0.0-alpha.5
npm/@intlify/core>=9.0.0-beta.10<11.4.14
11.4.14
npm/vue-i18n>=12.0.0-alpha.1<12.0.0-alpha.5
12.0.0-alpha.5
npm/vue-i18n>=9.0.0-beta.5<11.4.14
11.4.14

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@intlify/vue-i18n-core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 12.0.0-alpha.5
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@intlify/vue-i18n-core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 11.4.14
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/petite-vue-i18n to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 12.0.0-alpha.5
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/petite-vue-i18n to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 11.4.14
  5. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@intlify/core-base to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 12.0.0-alpha.5
  6. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@intlify/core-base to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 11.4.14
  7. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@intlify/core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 12.0.0-alpha.5
  8. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@intlify/core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 11.4.14
  9. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/vue-i18n to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 12.0.0-alpha.5
  10. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/vue-i18n to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 11.4.14
  11. Upgrade

    Upgrade vue-i18n to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 11.4.14
  12. Upgrade

    Upgrade vue-i18n to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 12.0.0-alpha.5
  13. Compensating control

    When escapeParameter is enabled (escapeParameterHtml in the Legacy API), do not pass list and named values in the same translation call.

  14. Compensating control

    Do not render translations that can contain untrusted values with v-html.

  15. Compensating control

    Use component interpolation (<i18n-t>) instead of rendering translations as HTML.

Event History

Oct 28, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·09:06 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·09:06 PM
DescriptionWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which applications are exposed to this issue?

Applications are exposed when parameter escaping is enabled through escapeParameter or the Legacy API's escapeParameterHtml and they call the public t(key, list, options) overload with both list values and options.named values. In that case, list strings are escaped but named values are not.

2

What does an attacker need to control to exploit the issue?

An attacker would need to supply a value that reaches the named interpolation parameters in a translation call that also supplies list parameters. The bypass affects the named values specifically because the presence of a list causes the named-value escaping branch not to run.

3

How can we identify potentially affected code?

Review calls to t that pass a list argument and an options object containing named values, such as t(key, ['...'], { named: { ... } }). Prioritize cases where named values can contain untrusted input and parameter escaping is enabled.

4

Does translated-HTML sanitization provide any protection?

The translated string still passes through sanitizeTranslatedHtml(), which neutralizes event-handler attributes and javascript: URLs. This reduces exposure for those payload types, but it does not change the fact that named values bypass parameter escaping when both list and named values are supplied.

Contact

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