GHSA-9fpm-3445-2vx4: Code Injection
Summary
Langflow versions 1.3.0 through 1.10.2 contain a code-injection vulnerability in the Smart Transform (LambdaFilterComponent) component.
Smart Transform places flow-author instructions and a preview of its input data into a prompt asking an LLM to generate a Python lambda. It then extracts a one-line lambda from the model response, applies only syntactic format checks, evaluates it with Python's full builtins, and invokes the resulting function inside the Langflow process.
A malicious flow author can exploit this directly through the Instructions field. In deployments where an exposed flow passes attacker-controlled content into Smart Transform, an attacker may also exploit it indirectly through prompt injection, subject to the configured model following the injected instruction.
Vulnerability details
Vulnerable Code Location: src/lfx/src/lfx/components/llmoperations/lambdafilter.py (line 242 in v1.10.2)
python def validatelambda(self, lambdatext: str) -> bool: """Validate the provided lambda function text.""" return lambdatext.strip().startswith("lambda") and ":" in lambdatext
... return eval(lambdatext) # noqa: S307
For example, an attacker can attempt to make the model return:
lambda x: import("os").system("id")
This expression satisfies the vulnerable format checks. eval() creates the lambda with access to Python's default builtins, and the subsequent fn(data) invocation (in executelambda) executes the command.
Successful exploitation allows code execution with the privileges of the Langflow service process. This can expose or modify credentials, files, application data, and network resources accessible to that process, and may affect other tenants in shared deployments.
PoC
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/13c48fe1-7225-4e0d-9687-2d2df1e87f0e
Fix
The reported path was addressed by validating the generated code's AST and evaluating it with a restricted builtins mapping.
The mainline fix is in PR #13530 (1641b28f) and shipped in Langflow 1.11.0. The 1.10.3 backport is in PR #14071 (94859df3). Users should upgrade to Langflow 1.10.3 or later.
Workarounds
Until an upgrade is possible: - Remove Smart Transform from runnable flows. - Restrict flow creation, editing, and execution to trusted users. - Do not route untrusted or externally controlled data through Smart Transform. - Limit the Langflow process's filesystem, network, and credential access.
Credit
- Peyton Kennedy (p80n-sec) of Endor Labs — reporter (original finder) - SZXSec — reporter (duplicate report) - cyjhhh — reporter (duplicate report) - 0gur1 — reporter (duplicate report) - ajm4n — reporter (duplicate report, Finding 1 of a multi-finding submission) - andifilhohub — analyst - Jordan Frazier (jordanrfrazier) — remediation developer
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
pip/langflowto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.10.3 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Langflowto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.10.3 - Remove
Remove
Langflow Smart Transform (LambdaFilterComponent)from your environment.Remove Smart Transform from runnable flows.
- Compensating control
Do not route untrusted or externally controlled data through Smart Transform.
- Compensating control
Limit the Langflow process's filesystem, network, and credential access.
- Compensating control
Restrict flow creation, editing, and execution to trusted users.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are most exposed?
Deployments where untrusted or insufficiently trusted users can author or modify flows using Smart Transform are directly exposed. Deployments with an exposed flow that passes attacker-controlled content into Smart Transform may also be exposed through prompt injection.
What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?
A malicious flow author can place a payload in the Smart Transform Instructions field. For indirect exploitation, attacker-controlled input must reach Smart Transform and the configured model must follow the injected instruction.
What is the impact of successful exploitation?
The generated lambda is evaluated with Python's full builtins and then invoked inside the Langflow process. Successful exploitation can therefore execute attacker-controlled code in that process.
How can I identify potentially affected installations?
Langflow versions 1.3.0 through 1.10.2 are affected. Prioritize instances that use the Smart Transform LambdaFilterComponent, especially where flow authors or flow input are not fully trusted.