GHSA-9gfj-28hw-jchp: Path Traversal

Overview

Verified. Multiple Unrestricted Path Traversal vulnerabilities exist in the Knowns MCP docs and memory tools, allowing arbitrary file read, write, and deletion operations outside the project sandbox. The storage layer functions (Get, Create, Update, Rename, Delete) in both docstore.go and memorystore.go concatenate user-controlled paths with filepath.Join() without any containment validation.

Additionally, the docs.update action with a newPath parameter performs a file deletion via Rename(), but is classified as CapWrite in the permission registry rather than CapDelete. This allows an attacker with a read-write-no-delete preset to bypass deletion restrictions and destroy arbitrary files outside the project root.

Affected paths

| File Path | Role | Vulnerability & Execution Impact | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | internal/storage/docstore.go | Vulnerable Sink (Docs) | Path Traversal in File Operations (CWE-22): Get(), Create(), Update(), Rename(), Delete() join user-controlled path with filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), ...) without validating path containment. | | internal/storage/memorystore.go | Vulnerable Sink (Memory) | Path Traversal in Memory Operations (CWE-22): GetInLayer(), Create(), Update(), Delete() join user-controlled id with filepath.Join(dir, models.MemoryFileName(id)) without validation. | | internal/mcp/handlers/doc.go | Pass-Through Handler | Unsanitized Input Propagation: MCP handlers pass user-supplied path, folder, newPath directly to storage layer without sanitization. | | internal/mcp/handlers/memory.go | Pass-Through Handler | Unsanitized Input Propagation: MCP handlers pass user-supplied id directly to storage layer without sanitization. | | internal/permissions/registry.go | Authorization Bypass | Capability Misclassification (CWE-863): docs.update with newPath performs file deletion but is classified as CapWrite, bypassing CapDelete restrictions. |

Root Cause

Missing Path Containment in DocStore

In internal/storage/docstore.go, all file operations use filepath.Join() to construct absolute paths without validating that the resolved path remains within docsDir():

go // Get retrieves a doc by its relative path (without .md extension). func (ds DocStore) Get(path string) (models.Doc, error) { path = strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/") path = strings.TrimSuffix(path, ".md")

// VULNERABLE: No containment check absPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(path)+".md") if , err := os.Stat(absPath); err == nil { // ... return ds.parseFile(absPath, path, folder, false, "") } // ... }

// Create writes a new doc to .knowns/docs/{path}.md. func (ds DocStore) Create(doc models.Doc) error { if doc.Path == "" { return fmt.Errorf("doc path is required") } // VULNERABLE: No containment check absPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(doc.Path)+".md") if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(absPath), 0755); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("create doc dir: %w", err) } return ds.writeFile(absPath, doc) }

// Rename rewrites a doc to a new path and removes the old file. func (ds DocStore) Rename(oldPath string, doc models.Doc) error { // ... oldAbsPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(strings.TrimSuffix(oldPath, ".md"))+".md") newAbsPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(strings.TrimSuffix(doc.Path, ".md"))+".md") // ... if err := ds.writeFile(newAbsPath, doc); err != nil { return err } if oldAbsPath != newAbsPath { // VULNERABLE: Deletes file at oldAbsPath (can be outside docsDir) if err := os.Remove(oldAbsPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) { return err } } return nil }

// Delete removes a doc file. func (ds DocStore) Delete(path string) error { path = strings.TrimSuffix(path, ".md") // VULNERABLE: No containment check absPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(path)+".md") return os.Remove(absPath) }

Critical Flaws: - filepath.Join resolves ../ sequences natively - No post-Join prefix check (e.g., strings.HasPrefix(absPath, ds.docsDir())) - No rejection of absolute paths or path traversal sequences - Rename() performs file deletion via os.Remove(oldAbsPath), which can target files outside the docs directory

Missing Path Containment in MemoryStore

In internal/storage/memorystore.go, memory operations similarly lack path validation:

go // GetInLayer retrieves a memory entry by ID from a specific layer only. func (ms MemoryStore) GetInLayer(id, layer string) (models.MemoryEntry, error) { // ... dir, err := ms.dirForLayer(layer) if err != nil { return nil, err } // VULNERABLE: No containment check for id containing "../" absPath := filepath.Join(dir, models.MemoryFileName(id)) if , err := os.Stat(absPath); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("memory %q not found in %s layer", id, layer) } return ms.parseFile(absPath, layer) }

// Create writes a new memory entry to the appropriate layer directory. func (ms MemoryStore) Create(entry models.MemoryEntry) error { // ... dir, err := ms.dirForLayer(entry.Layer) if err != nil { return err } if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0755); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("create memory dir: %w", err) }

// VULNERABLE: No containment check for entry.ID containing "../" absPath := filepath.Join(dir, models.MemoryFileName(entry.ID)) return atomicWrite(absPath, []byte(renderMemory(entry))) }

// Delete removes a memory entry by ID. func (ms MemoryStore) Delete(id string) error { // ... filename := models.MemoryFileName(id)

dirs := []string{ms.projectDir(), ms.globalDir()} for , dir := range dirs { // VULNERABLE: No containment check absPath := filepath.Join(dir, filename) if , err := os.Stat(absPath); err == nil { return os.Remove(absPath) } }

return fmt.Errorf("memory %q not found", id) }

Authorization Bypass via Rename-as-Delete

In internal/mcp/handlers/doc.go, the handleDocUpdate() function accepts a newPath parameter that triggers a rename operation:

go func handleDocUpdate(getStore func() storage.Store, req mcp.CallToolRequest) (mcp.CallToolResult, error) { // ... if v, ok := stringArg(args, "newPath"); ok && strings.TrimSpace(v) != "" { doc.Path = strings.Trim(strings.TrimSuffix(v, ".md"), "/") } // ... if oldPath != doc.Path { if err := store.Docs.Rename(oldPath, doc); err != nil { return errFailed("rename doc", err) } // ... } // ... }

The Rename() function in docstore.go performs file deletion:

go if oldAbsPath != newAbsPath { if err := os.Remove(oldAbsPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) { return err } }

However, in internal/permissions/registry.go, docs.update is classified as CapWrite:

go "docs.update": {Capability: CapWrite, Target: TargetDoc, Risk: RiskMedium},

This allows an attacker with a read-write-no-delete preset (which permits CapWrite but denies CapDelete) to delete files by using docs.update with a newPath parameter.

Attack Vector

| Phase | Request / Action | Effect | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | 1. Arbitrary File Read | docs.get with path="../../../victim/secret" | Server reads file outside project root via path traversal in DocStore.Get(). | | 2. Arbitrary File Write | docs.create with folder="../../../victim" | Server writes file outside project root via path traversal in DocStore.Create(). | | 3. Arbitrary File Delete | docs.update with path="../outside/secret.md" and newPath="../../../victim/renamed.md" | Server deletes file outside project root via path traversal in DocStore.Rename(). Bypasses CapDelete restriction because docs.update is classified as CapWrite. | | 4. Memory File Read/Write | memory.update with id="x/../../../../victim/secret" | Server reads and overwrites file outside project root via path traversal in MemoryStore.Update(). |

Analysis

Classic Path Traversal Pattern

Both DocStore and MemoryStore follow the same vulnerable pattern: user-controlled input is concatenated with a base directory using filepath.Join(), then passed directly to file system operations (os.ReadFile, os.WriteFile, os.Remove, os.Stat) without any validation.

go absPath := filepath.Join(baseDir, filepath.FromSlash(userInput)) // No containment check: strings.HasPrefix(absPath, baseDir) // No rejection of ".." or absolute paths

filepath.Join resolves ../ sequences, allowing attackers to escape the intended directory: - Input: "../../../etc/passwd" - Result: /project/.knowns/docs/../../../etc/passwd → /etc/passwd

Rename-as-Delete Authorization Bypass

The Rename() function performs two operations: 1. Write the file to the new location (newAbsPath) 2. Delete the file from the old location (oldAbsPath)

Both paths are vulnerable to traversal. An attacker can: - Set path to a file outside the project (e.g., "../../../victim/target.md") - Set newPath to another location outside the project - The Rename() function will delete the file at path (outside the project)

Because docs.update is classified as CapWrite rather than CapDelete, this operation bypasses deletion restrictions in read-write-no-delete presets.

Compounding Factor - Unauthenticated Access

Due to the previously identified Auth Bypass vulnerability, all MCP tools are accessible without credentials when the server is started without a password, making this a zero-credential attack.

Fix

Patch is available right now at New Release.