GHSA-c75x-9x9h-28rm: Npm/@highcharts/grid-pro vulnerability
Impact When a single cell value is written to a data table, the column id is used as a key on the table's column collection without filtering, so a column id of proto resolves to Object.prototype, is taken for an existing column, and the write lands at the row index on Object.prototype; a column id of constructor writes onto the Object constructor in the same way. In Dashboards releases that still supported column aliases, the id is first resolved through the alias map, so a literal proto id is redirected harmlessly there, while an alias whose target is proto, which the connector's data table options accept, reaches the same write. An attacker who controls the column id can thereby set integer-keyed properties on Object.prototype, one per row index, holding the written value; named properties cannot be reached through these paths, because the row index is a number. The integer keys still affect every object in the page: reading an out-of-range index on any array or plain object returns the injected value, and for...in over any object yields the injected keys, so unrelated code can take branches it should not using attacker-supplied data, and rendering can fail as a side effect. In Dashboards the write is reached through the Highcharts component's connector write-back, which is enabled by default through allowConnectorUpdate and takes the column id from the component's columnAssignment, or in the earliest releases from the series name, when a point is updated; in Grid Pro it is reached through cell editing in earlier releases and remains reachable through the public DataTable API. Exploitation requires that untrusted data reach the board or Grid configuration and that a point be updated or a cell edited, or that the application write a cell with an untrusted column id.
Consequences beyond disruption depend on the consuming application.
Workarounds Two measures are needed. The first closes the paths that reach Object.prototype; the second covers table construction, which cannot be patched from outside the library.
1. Strip unsafe keys from untrusted column data
Apply this wherever column data enters your application, before it is handed to a grid, board or DataTable. This is the only measure that covers the DataTable constructor.
js function stripUnsafeColumnIds(columns) { for (const key of ['proto', 'constructor']) { if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(columns, key)) { delete columns[key]; } }
return columns; }
Grid.grid('container', { data: { columns: stripUnsafeColumnIds(untrustedColumns) } });
2. Patch the DataTable methods
Needed if your application passes column ids that originate from untrusted input to setCell, changeColumnId or setColumns. Run it once at startup.
js { const { DataTable } = Grid; // Or Dashboards
if (!DataTable) { throw new Error('Patch loaded before Grid'); }
const unsafe = (id) => id === 'proto' || id === 'constructor';
const setCell = DataTable.prototype.setCell; DataTable.prototype.setCell = function (columnId, ...rest) { if (unsafe(columnId)) { return; } return setCell.call(this, columnId, ...rest); };
const changeColumnId = DataTable.prototype.changeColumnId; DataTable.prototype.changeColumnId = function (columnId, newColumnId) { if (unsafe(columnId) || unsafe(newColumnId)) { return false; } return changeColumnId.call(this, columnId, newColumnId); };
const setColumns = DataTable.prototype.setColumns; DataTable.prototype.setColumns = function (columns, ...rest) { const safe = {};
for (const key of Object.keys(columns || {})) { if (!unsafe(key)) { safe[key] = columns[key]; } }
return setColumns.call(this, safe, ...rest); }; }
For npm, take DataTable from your import instead of the global — it is exported by Grid Lite, Grid Pro and Dashboards alike.
Obtaining the patched version The patched releases are available from all the usual distribution channels. With npm, upgrade the affected package to the patched version listed above, for example npm install @highcharts/dashboards@4.2.2. If you load Highcharts Dashboards from a CDN, use a versioned URL, for example https://code.highcharts.com/dashboards/4.2.2/dashboards.js. For more on each installation method, see the installation guide.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@highcharts/grid-proto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.2.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@highcharts/dashboardsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.2.2 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@highcharts/dashboardsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.2.2 - Compensating control
Patch DataTable.prototype.changeColumnId, DataTable.prototype.setCell, and DataTable.prototype.setColumns at application startup to reject columnId, newColumnId, or column keys equal to '__proto__' or 'constructor'; load the patch after Grid or Dashboards is available.
- Compensating control
Strip unsafe column IDs '__proto__' and 'constructor' from untrusted column data before passing it to the DataTable constructor, grid, or board.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue?
An attacker must be able to control a column ID used when writing a single cell value to a data table. In Dashboard releases that support column aliases, control of an alias target can also be sufficient if it resolves to __proto__.
What is the practical impact of a successful write?
The attacker can add integer-keyed properties, corresponding to row indexes, to Object.prototype and set them to written values. Those inherited keys can affect out-of-range indexed reads on arrays and plain objects and appear during for...in iteration over unrelated objects.
Are all prototype properties writable through this issue?
No. The affected paths use a numeric row index as the property name, so an attacker can create integer-keyed properties but cannot reach arbitrary named properties through these paths.
Does using a literal __proto__ column ID always trigger the issue?
Not in Dashboards releases that still support column aliases: a literal __proto__ ID is resolved through the alias map and redirected harmlessly. However, an alias whose target is __proto__ reaches the vulnerable write path.