GHSA-cx6f-vjhg-g3cc: OS Command Injection

Published Oct 23, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

The bash activator puts the caller-supplied prompt value into PS1 unescaped whenever promptvars is off at activation time, and assumes prompt expansion can never run afterwards. promptvars and posix mode are runtime shell state, not a property of the activation moment: re-enabling prompt expansion in the same shell (shopt -s promptvars, set -o posix) or starting an interactive child bash that inherits the exported PS1 makes bash expand the stored value and run the command substitution in it. An attacker who controls the prompt value gets command execution as the user who sources bin/activate.

This is a regression. 21.14.8 escaped $ and the backtick unconditionally and stays inert under the same sequence. The 21.14.9 fix for GHSA-6w3r-xr62-4xcp (#3418) rewrote that block and left bash with a path that stores the raw value whenever promptvars is off.

Affected area

Activation scripts (activate, activate.bat, activate.csh, activate.fish, activate.nu, Activate.ps1, activate.xsh) — specifically the bash bin/activate.

Attacker-controlled input

The --prompt value, which the security policy already lists as a value that may come from project metadata the user did not write. It reaches virtualenv as --prompt on the command line or as the prompt argument of the API, is written into bin/activate as the literal VIRTUALENVPROMPT assignment (correctly quoted, the value arrives there as data), and the script then copies it into PS1 without escaping $ or the backtick.

Example: a repository or tool config supplies a prompt such as x$(id > /tmp/ve-pwn)y; the victim creates and later activates the environment.

Details

Source of the latest release: src/virtualenv/activation/bash/activate.sh lines 140-160

sh if [ -z "${VIRTUALENVDISABLEPROMPT-}" ] && { [ -n "${BASHVERSION-}" ] || [ -n "${ZSHVERSION-}" ]; }; then OLDVIRTUALPS1="${PS1-}" # bash expands PS1 after decoding its prompt escapes when promptvars is on or in posix mode, so the prompt holds a # reference to the variable and its value never reaches that expansion; otherwise only the decode runs and # backslashes need doubling. ... if [ -n "${BASHVERSION-}" ] && { shopt -q promptvars || shopt -qo posix; }; then PS1='(${VIRTUALENVPROMPT-}) '"${PS1-}" else VIRTUALPROMPT="${VIRTUALENVPROMPT//\\/\\\\}" if [ -n "${ZSHVERSION-}" ]; then VIRTUALPROMPT="${VIRTUALPROMPT//\$/\\\$}" VIRTUALPROMPT="${VIRTUALPROMPT//\/\\\}" VIRTUALPROMPT="${VIRTUALPROMPT//\%/%%}" fi PS1="(${VIRTUALPROMPT}) ${PS1-}" unset VIRTUALPROMPT fi fi

Two separate mistakes combine:

1. A runtime shell option is treated as a constant. shopt -u promptvars at the moment of source does not bind the shell forever: shopt -s promptvars and set -o posix both re-enable PS1 expansion in the same shell. The code itself tests shopt -qo posix because posix mode expands the prompt regardless of promptvars, which shows the expansion state is not fixed by the activation. 2. The escaping that would keep the value inert in that mode is missing for bash. GHSA-5vjq-rrrf-7h2q ("activate runs commands from the environment name in zsh with PROMPTSUBST") fixed exactly this shape for zsh, reasoning that "a user can set it after activation", by escaping $ and the backtick. Bash lost the equivalent escaping in the same commit that added the zsh branch.

The rendered prompt shows the regression directly:

21.14.8 PS1 = (x\\$(id > /tmp/ve-pwn)y) <- escaped, inert 21.14.9 PS1 = (x$(id > /tmp/ve-pwn)y) <- raw value 21.14.12 PS1 = (x$(id > /tmp/ve-pwn)y) <- raw value

Relevant commit: 5f48d711 "fix(bash): preserve literal prompts in supported shells (#3418)", which removed the unconditional $/backtick escaping from the bash path. Advisory for that change: GHSA-6w3r-xr62-4xcp.

Proof of concept

Non-destructive payload: it runs id and writes the output to a file.

bash python -m virtualenv --no-seed --no-periodic-update --activators bash \ --prompt 'x$(id > /tmp/ve-pwn)y' /tmp/venv-demo

cat > /tmp/rc <<'EOF' shopt -u promptvars . /tmp/venv-demo/bin/activate shopt -s promptvars EOF

the prompt needs a tty; script(1) provides one printf 'exit\n' | script -qec 'bash --noprofile --rcfile /tmp/rc -i' /dev/null

cat /tmp/ve-pwn

Observed on 21.14.12:

$ cat /tmp/ve-pwn uid=1000(asrun) gid=1000(asrun) groups=1000(asrun),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),999(ollama)

The prompt printed as (xy). The same script against 21.14.8 creates no file; against 21.14.9 and 21.14.12 it does.

Triggers, all run in a pty, activation itself never executing anything; execution happens at the next prompt redraw after prompt expansion is enabled:

| After . bin/activate (activated with shopt -u promptvars) | 21.14.8 | 21.14.9 | 21.14.12 | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | shopt -s promptvars | inert | executes | executes | | set -o posix | inert | executes | executes | | export PS1, then start an interactive child bash (its promptvars defaults to on) | inert | executes | executes | | control: activation with default options | inert | inert | inert | | control: activation with set -o posix already on | inert | inert | inert |

The third trigger needs no explicit option change: the poisoned PS1 is inherited and the child bash expands it on its first prompt.

shopt -u promptvars is a documented way to make an expensive bash prompt cheap and appears in ~/.bashrc files for that reason; it is also the state left by some prompt wrappers. Whoever sources such an environment gets the unescaped value in PS1.

Impact

Command execution as the user who sources bin/activate, from a value the user may not have written (project metadata or tool config reaching --prompt). The value is also persisted in pyvenv.cfg and in the generated script, so it survives the activation that created it and fires later, in a different shell session, on the first prompt redraw with expansion enabled. No privilege elevation beyond the activating user.

Severity: high, matching GHSA-5vjq-rrrf-7h2q for the same class of prompt-expansion command injection reached by toggling a shell option after activation. If you consider the promptvars state a caller-controlled condition rather than a shell condition, this is medium; the fix is the same either way.

Versions tested

virtualenv 21.14.12 and 21.14.9 (affected), virtualenv 21.14.8 (unaffected control); CPython 3.14.7; Linux 6.x (WSL2); bash 5.1.16(1)-release. --prompt handling is platform independent; zsh/fish/csh/nu/PowerShell activators were not part of this report.

Known mitigation

For a user: activate with promptvars left at its default, or set VIRTUALENVDISABLEPROMPT=1 before activating, which skips the whole prompt block. Do not pass an untrusted value to --prompt.

Fix in the activator: escape $ and the backtick for bash as well, in both branches, with a single backslash ($ -> \$, backtick -> \ , \ -> \\). Verified on bash 5.1.16 that a PS1 built that way is inert with promptvars on, with promptvars off, and with promptvars off followed by posix mode, while still rendering the literal value on screen. That is better than both current shapes: 21.14.8's four-level escaping left stray backslashes on screen, which is why the block was rewritten.

sh else VIRTUALPROMPT="${VIRTUALENVPROMPT//\\/\\\\}" VIRTUALPROMPT="${VIRTUALPROMPT//\$/\\\$}" VIRTUALPROMPT="${VIRTUALPROMPT//\/\\\}" if [ -n "${ZSHVERSION-}" ]; then VIRTUALPROMPT="${VIRTUALPROMPT//\%/%%}" fi PS1="(${VIRTUALPROMPT}) ${PS1-}"

For the tests, tests/unit/activation/testbash.py::testbashpromptoptions already parametrises ("before", "after", "expected") and covers before="shopt -u promptvars" with after="". The missing axis is the transition: ("shopt -u promptvars", "shopt -s promptvars", ...) and ("shopt -u promptvars", "set -o posix", ...), with the existing PWNED check asserting no file was created.

Latest release

- [x] The problem reproduces on the latest virtualenv release.

Affected Software

1 affected componentFixes available
pip/virtualenv>=21.14.9<21.14.13
21.14.13

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/virtualenv to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 21.14.13
  2. Configuration

    Run shopt -s promptvars before activating the environment, rather than activating while promptvars is disabled.

    Bash promptvars = enabled
  3. Configuration

    Set VIRTUAL_ENV_DISABLE_PROMPT=1 before activating to skip the prompt block.

    virtualenv bash activator VIRTUAL_ENV_DISABLE_PROMPT = 1
  4. Compensating control

    Do not pass an untrusted value to virtualenv's --prompt option or prompt API argument.

Event History

Oct 23, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·08:47 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·08:47 PM
DescriptionWeaknessAffected Software

Contact

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