GHSA-fvjx-g9x8-3xqh: FreeSWITCH: Stack buffer overflow parsing the SDP a=crypto key material on inbound calls
FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.2, switchcoremediaaddcrypto() passed the encoded key and salt length from an inbound SDP a=crypto attribute to switchb64decode() as the destination capacity. A zero-length key and salt made that capacity underflow, allowing the decoded attribute to overflow a fixed stack buffer with sender-chosen bytes before the call was answered. On the shipped external profile, an unauthenticated caller can reach the SDES-SRTP parser, while profiles that challenge inbound calls remain affected for senders who can authenticate; setting rtpsecuremediainbound to false removes the path, and WebRTC DTLS-SRTP legs are unaffected. The overflow corrupts memory and can crash the FreeSWITCH process, dropping every active call, although remote code execution has not been demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.2.
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
FreeSWITCHto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.11.2 - Configuration
Set rtp_secure_media_inbound to false to remove the vulnerable SDES-SRTP parsing path.
FreeSWITCH rtp_secure_media_inbound = false