GHSA-g27h-8qhm-6pff: Out-of-bounds Read
Summary
A worksheet containing <mergeCell ref=""/> makes mergeCellsParser leave the cached rectangle empty, and cellInRange then indexes that empty slice without a length check. Every non-streaming cell API panics with index out of range [0] with length 0 on the first cell read after opening the file.
Where it is
cell.go, cellInRange
func cellInRange(cell, ref []int) bool { return cell[0] >= ref[0] && cell[0] <= ref[2] && cell[1] >= ref[1] && cell[1] <= ref[3] }
ref is indexed at four positions with no bounds check.
The caller that can hand it an empty slice, mergeCellsParser
if ref := ws.MergeCells.Cells[i].Ref; len(ws.MergeCells.Cells[i].rect) == 0 && ref != "" { if strings.Count(ref, ":") != 1 { ref += ":" + ref } rect, err := rangeRefToCoordinates(ref) if err != nil { return cell, err } = sortCoordinates(rect) ws.MergeCells.Cells[i].rect = rect } if cellInRange([]int{col, row}, ws.MergeCells.Cells[i].rect) {
The ref != "" condition means an empty ref skips the block that populates rect, so rect stays nil. The cellInRange call on the next line is unconditional and receives that nil slice.
Ref comes straight from xl/worksheets/sheetN.xml through encoding/xml, so an empty string is entirely attacker-controlled.
Impact
Any consumer that opens an untrusted workbook and reads a cell panics. The loop scans every merged cell, so any cell reference triggers it, not a specific one. Affected entry points include GetCellValue, GetCellType, GetCellFormula, SetCellValue and the in-cell branch of GetPictures. The streaming Rows and GetRows use the SAX path and do not go through this parser, and GetMergeCells routes through Rect() which errors cleanly, which is probably why this has not surfaced before.
There is no option or flag involved; opening the file succeeds and the panic fires on the first cell read. Unless the caller wraps the call in recover() it takes the process down.
This is a regression. Commit a34c81e (PR #1500, 2023-03-20) replaced checkCellInRangeRef, whose len(rng) != 2 guard returned cleanly for an empty ref, with the cached-rect fast path above, and the guard did not come along. git merge-base --is-ancestor confirms that commit is an ancestor of v2.11.0, so released versions are affected as well as HEAD.
Proof of concept
Executed at HEAD.
Build a minimal xlsx whose xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml contains:
<mergeCells count="1"><mergeCell ref=""></mergeCell></mergeCells>
Then:
f, err := excelize.OpenReader(bytes.NewReader(data)) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } , = f.GetCellValue("Sheet1", "A1")
Observed, running against the repository at HEAD:
panic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0 excelize.cellInRange cell.go:1691 excelize.(xlsxWorksheet).mergeCellsParser cell.go:1660 excelize.(File).getCellStringFunc cell.go:1512 excelize.(File).GetCellValue cell.go:72
OpenReader itself returns no error; the file is 1656 bytes. A1, B1 and A2 all reproduce it.
For context on how targeted this is, I ran a battery of 38 crafted files covering data validation, conditional formatting, cell and row references, number formats, cols, hyperlinks, dimension, shared strings and tables. Only the empty-ref merge cell panicked; everything else returned a clean error. The other parsing paths look well guarded.
Suggested fix
Skip the entry when the rectangle is empty, before the range test:
if len(ws.MergeCells.Cells[i].rect) == 0 { continue }
Credit goes to arpitjain099.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
go/github.com/xuri/excelize/v2to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.11.1-0.20260820023833-99903a3240e5 - Compensating control
In mergeCellsParser/cellInRange handling, skip a merged-cell entry when its cached rectangle is empty before calling cellInRange, so an empty <mergeCell ref=""/> cannot be indexed.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is realistically exposed to this issue?
Applications that open XLSX files from untrusted or externally supplied sources and then use non-streaming cell APIs are exposed. A crafted worksheet can cause the first cell read after opening the file to panic.
What must an attacker provide to trigger the failure?
The attacker must convince the application to process an XLSX worksheet whose sheet XML contains a mergeCell element with an empty ref attribute, such as <mergeCell ref=""/>. No authentication is required, but the application must open the crafted file and perform a non-streaming cell read.
What can be done if patching is not immediately possible?
Do not process untrusted XLSX files through non-streaming cell APIs. As an input control, reject worksheets whose xl/worksheets/sheetN.xml contains a mergeCell element with an empty ref attribute.
How can I determine whether an input file is attempting to trigger this issue?
Inspect the XLSX archive's xl/worksheets/sheetN.xml files for mergeCell elements with an empty ref value. Files containing <mergeCell ref=""/> can leave the cached merge range empty and trigger the panic during a cell read.