GHSA-g28h-2cmm-rj9x: Path Traversal
Summary
langchain-nvidia-ai-endpoints versions before 1.4.2 accepted local filesystem paths as image inputs for Vision Language Model (VLM) requests. If an application passed attacker-controlled image input to ChatNVIDIA or VLM reranking APIs, an attacker could cause files readable by the application process to be read and included in the outbound request to the configured NVIDIA/NIM model endpoint.
Impact
Applications are affected if they use VLM image inputs with ChatNVIDIA or NVIDIARerank and allow untrusted users to control image URLs or document image metadata.
An attacker who can control those inputs may be able to read local files accessible to the application process. Applications that do not use VLM image inputs, or that only pass trusted image references, are not affected.
Patched Version
Upgrade to langchain-nvidia-ai-endpoints >= 1.4.2.
The patched version rejects raw local filesystem paths for VLM image inputs. Supported inputs are remote URLs, data:image/...;base64,... URIs, and supported asset/file IDs.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, applications should reject local filesystem paths in user-controlled VLM image inputs and only allow trusted remote URLs, data URIs, or known safe asset/file IDs.
Applications should also run with least-privilege filesystem access so that the application process cannot read files it does not need.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
pip/langchain-nvidia-ai-endpointsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.4.2 - Upgrade
Upgrade
langchain-nvidia-ai-endpointsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.4.2 - Compensating control
Reject local filesystem paths in user-controlled VLM image inputs; allow only trusted remote URLs, data:image/...;base64,... URIs, or supported asset/file IDs.
- Compensating control
Run the application with least-privilege filesystem access so its process cannot read files it does not need.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which applications are exposed?
Applications are affected only if they use VLM image inputs with ChatNVIDIA or NVIDIARerank and allow untrusted users to control image URLs or document image metadata. Applications that do not use VLM image inputs, or that pass only trusted image references, are not affected.
What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?
An attacker must be able to control an image input or document image metadata that the application passes to the affected VLM APIs. They can then supply a local filesystem path, causing a file readable by the application process to be included in an outbound request to the configured NVIDIA/NIM model endpoint.
What can be done if an immediate upgrade is not possible?
Reject local filesystem paths in user-controlled VLM image inputs. The fixed version accepts remote URLs, data:image/...;base64,... URIs, and supported asset or file IDs instead.
How can the issue be remediated?
Upgrade langchain-nvidia-ai-endpoints to version 1.4.2 or later. This version rejects raw local filesystem paths for VLM image inputs.