GHSA-gfhx-hw2g-v5hg: XSS
Impact
serialize-javascript escapes its output so it is safe to embed inside a <script> element. In 7.1.1 that guarantee does not hold for function values: a crafted function body can carry a literal, unescaped </script> into the output, terminating the script element early so the remainder is parsed as HTML.
SCRIPTCLOSEREGEXP used <\/script[^>]> as its first alternative. The character class excludes only >, so a single match could run from one </script all the way to the next > anywhere in the source — swallowing a second, complete </script> along the way. Only one replacement is emitted per match, and the plain-code branch neutralizes just the leading < ('< ' + match.slice(1)), so the swallowed tag was re-emitted verbatim.
Reaching that shape requires </script in code position, which is legal JavaScript: x</script=+/ parses as x < /script=+/, a comparison against a regex literal.
js const serialize = require('serialize-javascript'); const src = "function f(x){ return x</script=+/ + '</script><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' }"; const out = serialize({ h: new Function('return ' + src)() }); // {"h":function f(x){ return x< /script=+/ + '</script><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' }}
Embedded as the README documents (<script>window.S = <%= serialize(state) %></script>) and parsed by Chromium, the script element ends at the injected tag and the <img> becomes a live DOM node with its onerror handler executing in the page origin.
Only the function path is affected. The same payload passed as data is escaped correctly, and options.isJSON / non-function values are unaffected.
Patches
Fixed in 7.1.2. The wildcard now excludes < as well as > ([^<>]), so a match can never reach past a second <. Every </script in the source therefore either begins its own match or is followed by a character the HTML tokenizer does not accept as ending a tag name — it ends the tag name only on TAB, LF, FF, CR, SPACE, / or >, and emits anything else as text.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 7.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, 7.1.0 and earlier are unaffected, or avoid serializing functions whose source text is attacker-influenced.
Regression note
This is a regression specific to 7.1.1, not a long-standing issue. 7.1.0 and earlier applied the same wildcard but escaped the entire match, so no tag survived. Downstream scanners defaulting to a >= 7.1.0 range would be overly broad.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/serialize-javascriptto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.1.2 - Upgrade
Upgrade
serialize-javascriptto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.1.2 - Compensating control
If you cannot upgrade, avoid serializing functions whose source text is attacker-influenced.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to this issue?
Applications are exposed when they serialize function values with serialize-javascript and embed the resulting output in a script element. The practical risk depends on whether an attacker can influence the serialized function body.
What does an attacker need to trigger the unsafe output?
The function source must contain </script in JavaScript code position, such as the legal expression x</script=+/. The vulnerable matching behavior can then leave a later complete </script> tag unescaped, allowing following content to be parsed as HTML.
How can I check whether my application may be affected?
Check whether you use serialize-javascript 7.1.1 and serialize functions into output that is placed in script elements. Review whether function source can contain attacker-controlled text or the </script pattern in code position.