GHSA-j43x-5hjq-rgxf: Erlang/plug vulnerability

Published Sep 23, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

Plug's nested-parameter decoder (Plug.Conn.Query) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.

Details

For a key like a[a][a]...=1, Plug.Conn.Query.splitkeys/6 (in lib/plug/conn/query.ex) builds an accumulator of :binary.part prefixes (a, a[a], a[a][a], …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. Plug.Conn.Query.insertkeys/3 then does one Map.put per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and Plug.Conn.Query.finalizepointer/2 repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is O(N²) in nesting depth.

The same code path handles query strings, application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies, and multipart field names via Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4 and decodeeach/2. The default Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but Plug.Parsers accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The decoder shows ~4× scaling per 2× input (16k levels ≈ 195 ms on a single scheduler).

PoC

1. POST a[a][a]...[a]=1 as application/x-www-form-urlencoded to any endpoint of a Plug-based app. Even at the 1 MB urlencoded-parser default the payload carries ~333,000 nesting levels; with the broader Plug.Parsers body limit (20 MB default) a single request can carry millions. 2. Launch one such request per scheduler concurrently. Each pins a scheduler for minutes; legitimate traffic stalls once all schedulers are busy.

Impact

A single low-bandwidth sender can render any internet-reachable Plug-based service (most Phoenix and standalone Elixir/Erlang web stacks) unresponsive. No credentials, specific endpoint, or prior knowledge of the application is required.

References

Introduction commit: https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/712b875d3442c765d8d37e546ffd5ad9f8afcc55 Patch commit: https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/b4aa8a0665ce2726a6d5af44467fb4f59595b107

Affected Software

5 affected componentsFixes available
erlang/plug>=1.19.0<1.19.3
1.19.3
erlang/plug>=1.18.0<1.18.3
1.18.3
erlang/plug>=1.17.0<1.17.2
1.17.2
erlang/plug>=1.16.0<1.16.4
1.16.4
erlang/plug>=1.15.0<1.15.5
1.15.5

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade erlang/plug to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.19.3
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade erlang/plug to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.18.3
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade erlang/plug to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.17.2
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade erlang/plug to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.16.4
  5. Upgrade

    Upgrade erlang/plug to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.15.5

Event History

Sep 23, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·02:00 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·02:00 PM
DescriptionWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which request paths can trigger the expensive parsing behavior?

The affected decoder is used for query strings, application/x-www-form-urlencoded request bodies, and multipart field names. Any reachable Plug-based HTTP endpoint that processes these inputs may be exposed.

2

Does an attacker need credentials or a large payload?

No authentication is required if the attacker can reach the endpoint. A single small request containing a deeply bracket-nested parameter name can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes.

3

Do the default parser limits prevent this issue?

No. Although Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED has a default 1 MB cap, Plug.Parsers can accept URL-encoded payloads up to its overall 20 MB default body limit, allowing substantially more per-request work.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203