GHSA-j82w-28jv-3pmj: Addressable: Regular Expression Denial of Service in templates with certain exploded expressions
Impact
Within the URI template implementation in Addressable, templates using the (explode) modifier with the /, ., ;, ? or & operators (e.g., {/segments}, {.ext}, {;params}, {?query}) generate regular expressions vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking. When Template#match or Template#extract is called with a maliciously crafted URI that starts with the operator's leading character, matching takes exponential time, leading to uncontrolled resource consumption and denial of service. An input under 60 bytes is enough to occupy a thread for minutes.
GHSA-h27x-rffw-24p4 (CVE-2026-35611) reported this pattern as fully remediated in 2.9.0. The 2.9.0 fix only made the joiner between exploded members mandatory for templates without an operator, and its regression specs used inputs that never start with the operator's leading character, so the vulnerable part of the expression was never reached. This issue was originally reported in #364 by @ebenoist in 2019 but insufficiently investigated.
Users of the URI parsing capabilities in Addressable but not the URI template matching capabilities are unaffected. Users who only call Template#expand are unaffected.
Affected Versions
This vulnerability affects Addressable >= 2.3.0 (note: 2.3.0 and 2.3.1 were yanked; the earliest installable release is 2.3.2), including 2.9.0. It is fixed in 2.9.1.
The vulnerability is only exploitable on Ruby implementations whose regular expression engine backtracks without memoization: MRI Ruby < 3.2 and JRuby. MRI Ruby 3.2 and later are not affected: their regular expression engine memoizes backtracking, so these patterns still match in linear time. TruffleRuby 40.0 is not affected either. Earlier TruffleRuby versions were not tested.
This has been confirmed on the following runtimes with Addressable 2.9.0:
| Runtime | Status | |---------|--------| | MRI Ruby 2.7 | Vulnerable | | MRI Ruby 3.1 | Vulnerable | | MRI Ruby 3.2 | Not affected | | MRI Ruby 3.3 | Not affected | | MRI Ruby 3.4 | Not affected | | MRI Ruby 4.0 | Not affected | | JRuby 9.4 | Vulnerable | | TruffleRuby 40.0 | Not affected |
Workarounds
- Upgrade to MRI Ruby 3.2 or later, if the consuming application does not use JRuby. - Avoid matching user-supplied input on unpatched versions of the library against templates that use the modifier with the /, ., ;, ? or & operators. - Apply a short timeout around any call to Template#match or Template#extract that processes user-supplied data.
Credits
Reported independently by @ebenoist, @andrewstellman, and then @halogenandtoast.
For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
rubygems/addressableto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.9.1 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Addressableto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.9.1 - Upgrade
Upgrade
MRI Rubyto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.2 - Compensating control
Apply a short timeout around any call to Template#match or Template#extract that processes user-supplied data.
- Compensating control
On unpatched Addressable versions, avoid matching user-supplied input against templates that use the * modifier with the /, ., ;, ? or & operators.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which uses of Addressable are affected?
The issue affects URI template matching or extraction through Template#match or Template#extract when a template uses an exploded expression with the /, ., ;, ?, or & operator. URI parsing alone and use of Template#expand alone are unaffected.
What must an attacker be able to supply to trigger the denial of service?
An attacker needs to provide a crafted URI to Template#match or Template#extract for an affected template. The URI must start with the leading character of the relevant operator; an input under 60 bytes can occupy a thread for minutes.
Which template patterns should be prioritized for review?
Review templates containing exploded expressions such as {/segments*}, {.ext*}, {;params*}, {?query*}, or equivalent expressions using the & operator. These combinations generate the vulnerable regular expressions.
Does the earlier 2.9.0 remediation eliminate this issue?
No. The advisory states that the 2.9.0 change did not reach the vulnerable expression path for inputs beginning with the operator's leading character, so the pattern remained exploitable.