GHSA-jf5h-36mg-rp6x: Medium severity npm/@apostrophecms/import-export vulnerability
Review scope and evidence limits
Package: @apostrophecms/import-export, version 3.7.0.
Release tag reviewed: @apostrophecms/import-export@3.7.0, commit 9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce (September 30, 2026).
Current main reviewed: 5ce3732be0ebdebb4db0f8ef160c81e8671157e6.
The importer, gzip extractor, import permission gate, and core permission implementation have no differences between that release tag and the reviewed main. This follow-up is a static remediation review. We have not repeated the original end-to-end reproductions against the latest release or tested a deployed site. Current exploitability and impact therefore still require maintainer validation; the observations below establish that the reported security checks remain absent in public source. The original emailed PDF contains the original reproduction material. Please refer to that existing private attachment.
Archive duplicate continuation permits unauthorized published-content replacement
The overrideDuplicates() continuation still accepts client-supplied replacement choices, rather than binding them to a server-maintained, user-owned duplicate analysis. The replacement and write helpers do not establish a single canonical resource identity and authorization context before the update. This leaves the reported gap between draft editing authority and the published target selected for replacement unresolved at source level.
The original report describes a contributor crossing the publication boundary through duplicate replacement on an import-enabled localized type. We have not repeated that end-to-end sequence on 3.7.0.
Suggested remediation: bind continuation state to the initiating user, archive, job, permitted source/target mapping, locale and mode; reject inconsistent identity metadata; derive permissions from the actual loaded target and require publication authority for published targets.
Source: overrideDuplicates(), replaceDocId(), and insertOrUpdateDoc() in the importer.
Coordination
Vivek R / Winfunc Original reporting team: Mufeed VH / Winfunc
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@apostrophecms/import-exportto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.7.1 - Compensating control
Bind import continuation state to the initiating user, archive, job, permitted source/target mapping, locale, and mode, rather than accepting unbound client-supplied replacement choices.
- Compensating control
Reject continuation requests with inconsistent identity metadata.
- Compensating control
Derive permissions from the actually loaded replacement target and require publication authority when the target is published.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What level of access does an attacker need?
The CVSS vector indicates that low privileges are required and no user interaction is needed. The described issue involves client-supplied replacement choices in an import continuation.
Is the issue confirmed to be fixed in the reviewed release or current main branch?
No. The review found no differences in the importer, gzip extractor, import permission gate, or core permission implementation between version 3.7.0 and the reviewed main branch, and reported security checks remain absent in public source. The review was static only, so current exploitability and impact still require maintainer validation.