GHSA-jqgh-w3cc-7jqw: Npm/@highcharts/dashboards vulnerability
Impact The data cursor keeps its listener and state bookkeeping in plain objects keyed by data table id, so a table id of proto supplied in the dataPool connector configuration resolves to Object.prototype when a sync registers its listeners, and the registration creates a property on Object.prototype named after the sync state and holding the internal listener array. The property name begins with a state prefix fixed by the library, to which the sync group option can append an attacker-chosen suffix, and its value is the library's own listener array, but the property is enumerable and visible on every object in the page, and emitting a lasting state for that table id then throws, so syncs that keep lasting states, such as extremes, stop working. Exploitation requires that untrusted data reach the Dashboards configuration and that a sync such as highlight or extremes be enabled on a component using that table, which the same configuration can do. No user interaction is required beyond loading the board.
The injected property is inert until other code on the page reads or enumerates it, so consequences depend on the consuming application.
Workarounds Drop-in fix - for any Highcharts Dashboards versions affected (1.0.0-4.2.1). Add the below IIFE to run after Highcharts Dashboards is loaded.
!function(t){if(t&&t.DataCursor&&t.DataTable){var e=t.DataCursor.prototype,r=t.DataTable.prototype;e.tableIdPollutionPatched||(e.tableIdPollutionPatched=!0,null!==Object.getPrototypeOf((new t.DataCursor).listenerMap)&&['addListener','emitCursor','remitCursor','removeListener'].forEach(function(t){var r=e[t];r&&(e[t]=function(){var t;return t=this,['listenerMap','stateMap'].forEach(function(e){var r,a=t[e];a&&null!==Object.getPrototypeOf(a)&&(r=Object.create(null),Object.keys(a).forEach(function(t){r[t]=a[t]}),t[e]=r)}),r.apply(this,arguments)})}),'proto'!==new t.DataTable({id:'proto'}).id||Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(r,'id')||Object.defineProperty(r,'id',{configurable:!0,enumerable:!0,get:function(){return this.safeTableId},set:function(e){'proto'!==e&&'constructor'!==e||(e=t.uniqueKey(),this.autoId=!0),this.safeTableId=e}}))}}(Dashboards);
Live demo & testing
Obtaining the patched version The patched releases are available from all the usual distribution channels. With npm, upgrade the affected package to the patched version listed above, for example npm install @highcharts/dashboards@4.2.2. If you load Highcharts Dashboards from a CDN, use a versioned URL, for example https://code.highcharts.com/dashboards/4.2.2/dashboards.js. For more on each installation method, see the installation guide.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@highcharts/dashboardsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.2.2 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@highcharts/dashboardsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.2.2
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed?
Deployments are exposed when untrusted input can reach the Dashboards configuration and configure a dataPool connector with a table ID of `__proto__`. A sync such as `highlight` or `extremes` must also be enabled on a component using that table.
Does exploitation require a user to interact with the dashboard?
No. Loading the board is sufficient once the malicious configuration is in place.
What should responders look for to identify impact?
Look for connector configurations using the table ID `__proto__` together with enabled syncs. Affected pages gain an enumerable property on `Object.prototype` whose name includes the library's state prefix and may include the configured sync group; emitting a lasting state can then throw and prevent lasting-state syncs such as `extremes` from working.